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ABSTRACT 
The study examines a proposal to auction rights to land at a major airport and return the 
auction revenues to the winners. Experiments with such auctions are reported. New econometric 
models of the process are developed and evaluated. 
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In 1984 the Port Authority of New York (the Port) issued a request for proposals for a study 
of methods to allocate the right to use the major New York airports. The Port was considering a 
special type of auction process which seemed to meet the Port 's needs. The Port wanted to know the 
details of the process should it be implemented and how it would perform once in place. The 
contract was let and the consulting engineers (Ff A 1985) delivered a recommendation. The research 
reported in this study has grown from questions motivated by the consultant's recommendations. 
National politics has intervened to prevent the Port from a continued study or to take action on the 
recommendation. 
The issues are of interest to a broad audience of economists . The Port's problem is not 
unique. Several airports face similar problems and the solution adopted by the Port would have 
implications for the decisions of other airports and the future of the air transportation industry. More 
importantly, the problem faced by the Port is of a general type faced by certain public agencies that 
have been granted the right to allocate the private use of public resources. A study of the Port's 
problems has theoretical implications for several large segments of government at all levels. 
This paper reports the results of experiments with a zero-out auction process considered by 
the Port. No other source of data about how the process might work exists. The type of model that 
should be applied or even the principles that underlie models of how the process might work in 
practice are controversial . The research in this paper rests on the assumption that a scientific 
understanding of what goes on in very simple cases that we are able to study will lead to better 
predictions about what will happen in the complex cases, like the Port's problem. 
The paper is written to reflect a process of learning about the phenomena as the research 
progressed. First the Port 's problem and the experimental setting are outlined in Sections I and II. A 
model that has proved useful in other market contexts, the static Nash equilibrium, is developed in
Section III. Initial experiments answered some of the Port's questions but the obvious presence of 
dynamic adjustments motivated a second set of experiments and an extension of theory beyond static 
Nash. The data from two sets of experiments are presented in Section I V. Section V begins with 
the traditional approach to modeling dynamics as a series of equilibria. The section ends with an 
alternative approach and proposes two models that explain the dynamics in terms of individual 
optimization without system consistency constraints. 
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Historically, experimentalists have been hampered by an inability to deal with data 
generated by equilibrating markets. Theories about the dynamics of experimental markets are 
almost nonexistent. By going beyond the analysis of the static model, the paper is a first step in 
approaching this more general class of problems in a manner that is econometrically tractable. In 
particular, we shall propose some relatively simple theoretical and econometric dynamic models 
which will be evaluated on the basis of their explanatory and predictive power of the dynamics 
observed in the experiment . 
SECTION I. THE PROPOSED POLICY 
A. The Port's Allocation Problem 
The Port Authority of New York operates three major airports (La Guardia, John F. 
Kennedy, and Newark). Growth of air traffic since deregulation has been such that further growth is 
prevented by the physical facilities and environmental, safety, and political considerations. More 
carriers wish to use the facility than can be accommodated. The Port would like to have an 
allocation process that i s  economically efficient in the sense that the most efficient carriers get the 
use of the Port's resources and that meets an additional distributional criterion that all of the surplus 
accrue to the users. 
The problem is  not new to governmental agencies. The private use of scarce public 
resources is frequently associated with the problem. Hunting permits are sometimes allocated 
randomly to applicants. Permits to access remote or natural areas and campsites are issued on a first 
come, fi served basis. Private permits to white water rivers are sometimes allocated by lottery . In 
all cases the resale of the permit is  prohibited and great effort i s  expended to make sure that the user 
i s  the same person that was awarded the permit. The general allocation problem is  to get the pennits 
to the people who value them in use while simultaneously granting the user the full consumer 's 
surplus .  A preference revelation problem of substantial magnitude is  involved. A satisfactory 
solution might not exist even in theory. 
Clearly auction processes would do the job of getting the rights to land in the hands of the 
most efficient carriers, but the Port cannot take the money. Random allocation with an aftermarket 
would solve part of the problem but such a process has little chance of surviving the politics. The 
Port does not want to grandfather the rights to the resources and permit buying and selling. That 
process also faces political problems. So, the Port wanted to explore something new. 
B. The Zero-Out Auction 
The zero-out process recommended to the Port is simple in concept. The right to take off 
during a particular period of each day was defined as a "slot." Other constrained resources such as 
parking, gate space, baggage facilities, counter space, etc. are not addressed in this initial study . The 
process involves the periodic auction of slots which are to be fixed in number. Each hour of the day 
constitutes a different auction for the right to take off one time during that hour every day for the 
next year. Carriers desiring slots would tender a separate bid for each slot desired during a given 
hour. Available slots would be allocated to the highest bidders who would pay the amount of the 
bid. 
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The Port would not keep the funds (aside from the cost of administering the process). 
Instead the revenues would be distributed back to the carriers that operated at the airport by a 
function of the number of passengers enplaned in New York during the period. Specifically, suppose 
the carrier holding a slot at time t enplaned x passengers on that flight during the twelve-month
period. Suppose further that a total of y passengers were enplaned at the airport over the twelve­
month period. If the revenue generated by the auction is R , then (x /y) · R is rebated
to the carrier at the end of the period. 
The policy would permit an aftermarket in slots. Of course the rebate formula must be
complicated by a process of accounting for the fact that slots might change hands. The lease of slots, 
the nonuse of slots, bankruptcy, etc. would be anticipated by the policy. However, these 
complications will not be considered in the analysis below. 
SECTION II. THE EXPERIMENT AL APPROACH 
A. The Research Strategy 
While many issues are of interest to the Port, 1 the focus of this report is only on one
dimension of the problem related to the auction process itself. Will the process involve some sort of 
inflation of bids over the values which would occur if a regular auction were used as opposed to the 
zero-out auction? How much inflation would occur? Is the process efficient? What type of model 
would help answer those questions and what data would need to be collected in order to use the 
model? What type of confidence should be placed in the model? The other questions, such as fares 
or the implications of returning funds based on enplaned passengers, will not be addressed. 
If the bids inflated sufficiently, the whole process could become a political embarrassment of 
major proportions. The Port could be ridiculed in the press. Inflation might have implications for 
efficiency. For example, small airlines might be excluded because they could not obtain financing 
for their bids. Even without the other dimensions of the problem, inflation is difficult. 
The research strategy is to begin with a simple case to see if we are able to provide 
satisfactory answers there. Tools that cannot accurately explain what is seen in a simple setting 
would have no real claim to reliability when applied to the Port's problem. The purpose of this 
paper is to examine only a simple case as a test of basic ideas. If the tools predict well in the simple 
case, then the policy strategy would be to undertake additional studies which would increasingly 
complicate the study case until either we are unable to provide an answer or the Port would be 
prepared to make decisions based on answers that are available. Thus in this report we analyze a 
very simple case that isolates some of the central issues. 
B. Experimental Design 
The behavior of the process was studied under two sets of parameters that will be referenced 
as parameter set 1 and parameter set 2. Three experiments were conducted with each set. Aside 
from the parameters, which will be given below, the two sets of experiments were procedurally 
identical. Twelve subjects recruited from the California Institute of Technology were randomly 
divided into two groups, Market 1 and Market 2, with six buyers in each market. Market 1 can be 
interpreted as one time of day such as morning and Market 2 a different time such as afternoon. 
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Each subject i was assigned a redemption value Vi for a single unit and each subject was 
assigned a capacity number Xi. The value Vi can be interpreted as the profit that a carrier gains from 
the operation of a slot without considering the price paid for the slot. Of course, because of the 
single unit valuation, each subject wanted only a single unit, or slot, in the airport jargon . A total of 
four units (slots) were sold in each market. The capacity numbers can be interpreted as the number 
of passengers the carrier would enplane in New York if the carrier acquired the slot . The capacity 
numbers were common knowledge, but the redemption values were kept as private information. 
Each subject was also assigned a capital payment which was paid independently of his/her decisions. 
The capital payments were used to keep earnings above some minimum level. 
The bidding procedure was a sealed-bid discriminative auction. So, in each market the four 
units were sold to the four highest bidders in that market. The winners received their redemption 
values plus a proportion of the revenue rebated from both markets. The proportion rebated is given 
by the ratio of the subject's capacity Xi to the sum of capacities of the winners in both markets. 
Those who do not win in the auction received only the capital payment assigned to them. After the 
instructions (see Appendix B) were read, a small test was given to make sure that each subject 
understood the details of the procedure. After every period the highest bid, the lowest accepted bid, 
and the highest rejected bid in each market, the winners, and the amount of each rebate were 
announced. 
The two different parameter sets are in Table 1. The differences in the two sets reflect an 
attempt to change the predictions of the Nash model. The experimental results from parameter set 1 
were known when the parameter set 2 was developed. The second set thus reflects an attempt to test 
aspects of theory for which set 1 proved inappropriate . 
SECTION III .  A STATIC EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
The complete information static Nash equilibrium model has a long and reasonably 
successful history in applied work. Experimental markets are regularly observed converging to such 
equilibria in dynamic settings even when the underlying informational and behavioral assumptions 
of this equilibrium concept are not exactly satisfied in the experimental design (Plott 1 982; Smith 
1982). Thus, we first characterize the Nash equilibria (NE) in a one-shot game model which reflects 
all the simplifying and special conditions of the experiment. Although slight generalizations of the 
assumptions are consistent with the existence of a Nash equilibrium, we do not pursue such 
generalizations, as our aim is th� analysis of the particular experiments . 
Figures 1 and 2 contain a diagram of the Nash equilibria in parameter set 1 and parameter set 
2 respectively. The vertical axis is the magnitude of the winning bid in market 1 and the horizontal 
axis is the winning bid in market 2. The diamond shaped figures are the sets of Nash equilibrium 
bids for the parameters. The lines A and B bounding the base of the diamonds are the pairs of bids 
that give expected zero profit after rebate to agents five and six of market 1 and agents eleven and 
twelve in market 2. At the static Nash equilibria these are the extramarginal (first excluded) agents 
in the two markets. The upper bounds of the rhomboid, lines C and D, are the pairs of bids that give 
zero profi to agents four and ten who are the marginal (last included) agents in markets 1 and 
markets 2 respectively. 
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Table 1 :  Parameters 
Exp/Market Subject Value, V; Capacity, X; 
1 100 20 
2 100 20 
Exp 1 ,2,3 3 75 15 
Market 1 4 75 15 
5 50 15 
Parameter 6 50 15 
Set 1 7 100 15 
8 100 15 
Exp 1 ,2,3 9 50 10 
Market 2 10 50 10 
1 1  25 10 
12 25 10  
1 100 200 
2 100 200 
Exp 4,5,6 3 75 200 
Mruket 1 4 75 100 
5 50 100 
Parameter 6 50 100 
Set 2 7 75 100 
8 75 100 
Exp 4,5,6 9 50 100 
Market 2 10  50 50 
1 1 25 50 
12  25 50 
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Thus the static game model predicts winning bids that are inside the rhomboid. The lower 
left point of the rhomboid is predicted by a special dynamic model and it is the only "trembling 
hand" Nash equilibrium. 
In order to justify the geometry, a fonnal development of the model is necessary. 
A l .  The day is divided into K = 2 periods.2 A total of Q = 4 slots is available in each period.
K (Q + 2) carriers are exogenously partitioned into K submarkets corresponding to the K
periods. In each submarket there are Q + 2 bidders. There is no aftennarket.
Let 
J = {1,2, ... , 12} =index set of carriers 
K = { 1, 2} = index set of sub markets 
Vj = value of a slot to firm j
Xj = the enplaned passengers (capacity) of carrier j should it be allocated a slot 
B j= the bid tendered by carrier j 
kU) = the submarket in which carrier j participates. kU) = 1 for j e {1,2,3,4,5,6} and kU) = 2 
forj e {7,8, 9,10,ll ,12}. 
ll. k = maximum rejected (second lowest) bid in submarket k 
Wk = the set of carriers that tendered winning bids in submarket k. If there are no ties, then 
Wk = {j e J : k (j) = k and B j > ll. k} 
W = W 1 u W 2 = auction winners 
R = L Bj =revenue 
jeW 
X· Zj = L 1 = rebate factor of carrier j should it win a slot xi 
ieW 
A2. Each finn wants only a single slot in the submarket it is operating. It places no value on 
additional slots or on slots at any other time of day. 
Using the above notation we have 
{V· +Z·R -B· J J J 
Ilj =profit of carrier j = 0 
if j E W 
otherwise 
Note that Lje w Zj = 1; that is, all the revenue from the auction is rebated to the winning carriers. 
The finns are indexed so that if i > j ' then vi ;;:: vj for all i 'j such that k (i) = k u) = k for all
k E K. 
A3. Xi ;;::xj if i <j for allj such that k(i)=kU)=k for all k e K. 
A4. Ties are broken randomly. 
Let B = (Bi. ... , Biz) be a vector of bids. Note that the winning set W may be random 
because of A4. Define (B j;B) to be the vector, B, in which the j th component is replaced by BJ· 
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Defin ition . B •.is a Nash equilibrium if E rr1 (B • ) � E rr1 (BJ; B •)for all s1 for all j e J. The
notation E denotes an expected value. 
That is, we say that B • is a Nash equilibrium if, given that others use the bids given by B *, no 
bidder j can be made better off in an expected value sense by tendering a different bid BJ # B j .  Let
w;, k E K, denote the set of winning bidders in a Nash equilibrium in submarket k, and w* denote
the set of winners in both submarkets. No confusion should develop from possible nonuniqueness of 
Nash equilibria. The notation is relative to a given Nash equilibrium. 
Let 
if j E W* 
otherwise. 
Let !1 � and Bk* be respectively the maximum rejected bid and the minimum accepted bid in market
k at Nash equilibrium, i.e., !1 � =max {B1" : j � w; and k (j) = k} ands;= min {Bj : j E w; and
k(j)=k}. 
First we make several observations about the Nash equilibria given assumptions Al-A4. 
(i) At a Nash equilibrium all winners in a given market bid the same amount, namely ff;. 
Suppose not. Then the agent bidding higher than the other winners could reduce his bid by 
some small amount and still be among the winners, thereby increasing his/her profit. 
(ii) Nash equilibrium winning bidders in each market are the bidders with highest valuations. 
This is true because the valuations and capacities are ordered in the same way (A3) , so that 
given (i) above, if one or more of the carriers with valuations among the top four in a market 
were not in w;, then at least one carrier with lowest valuation, say j ,  is in w; and either : 1) J
is making negative profit, in which case he/she could strictly increase his/her profit by bidding 
zero, or 2) j is making nonnegative profits, in which case one of the excluded bidders (which 
has higher V and X than does j)  could bid some small amount above BJ which would
guarantee him a slot, given the bid of others, and make his profits strictly higher. 
(iii) At a Nash equilibrium one has !l.. k #ff;. There can be no ties to determine which bidder is
in W. To see this use (i) above, and follow the same reasoning as in (ii). 
From these observations we conclude that at a Nash equilibrium, if one exists, the winning 
set w• is nonrandom. In each submarket k the four bidders with the highest valuations are the 
winners, i.e., W� = {l, 2, 3, 4} and w; = {7,8,9,10}. Moreover, the winners tender a common bid ff; 
strictly greater than the maximum fl� of the bids of the two buyers with lowest valuations. 
Under assumptions Al-A4 existence and uniqueness problems occur immediately due to the 
discontinuity of the payoff function, i.e. , each winning player has incentive to get as close as 
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possible to fl.: but not bid fl.: because then a tie and a lottery will occur. Since each player is 
attempting to minimize a bid over an open set, no equilibrium exists. There are several ways to 
avoid this problem: inherent discreteness of the bid space, some randomness due to mixed 
strategies, "trembling hands," or randomness in the process itself can produce equilibrium. In our 
case, the first reason is sufficient so that we have 
for all k e K
where e is an arbitrarily small, positive quantity. 
We shall now show that the set of Nash equilibria is the rhomboids of Figure 1 and 2. Let 
R * be the Nash equilibrium revenue, i.e., 
• R* = Q Li;. 
keK 
From the definition of Nash equilibrium it is clear that winners must prefer winning to 
nonparti ci pation: 
vj +ZjR* -B:u> � o for all Jew*, 
and for carriers j � w• it should be the case that bidding i;0) gives expected nonpositive profit,
i.e., 
where z/ is the equal weight average of Xj l"I:.i e w· over all sets w' which differ from w* in that j 
replaces one other carrier in w;U). Putting j =4,10 in (2) and j = 5,11 in (3) we obtain the 
rhomboids of figures 1 and 2. Conversely, it can be shown using assumption A3 that any points in 
these rhomboids define a Nash equilibrium pair (B; , s;) of accepted bids.
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
As was stated earlier the two lines, which are defined by (3) and which are closest to the 
origin, identify the combinations of winning bids in the two markets that would produce zero 
expected profits for the extramarginal subjects. Alternatively, these lines define the inframarginal 
bids s; that are sufficiently high to keep the extramarginal agents out of the market. They intersect
at a Nash equilibrium that we will call the Distinguished Nash equilibrium. The other Nash 
equilibria are found in the shaded convex body bounded by (2) when applied to j e { 4,10} and 
evaluated at zero. They are the prices low enough to keep the inframarginal subjects in the market 
with nonnegative net profits. 
Reasonable assumptions can be used to reduce the set of equilibria. Notice that in the 
interior of the solution set the inequality (3) is strict inequality. That is, the excluded carriers [who 
bid fl.: = s:1c1 + e)] are bidding so high that should they replace one of the winning carriers, they
would make negative profits on average. If some chance actually existed that these excluded bidders 
might win, e.g., trembling hand, the maximum they would bid would be given by the equality in (3). 
This observation reduces the set of equilibria to a single point E* in the figure that we call the 
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,Distinguished Nash . In this case equilibrium is given by the solution to a set of two equations in two 
-. -. 
unknowns (B 1 ,B z ). Specifically, from (3) written for j = 5, 11, we obtain:
-. I -. -. B l = Vs + Z 5Q (B i + B 2 ) 
s; =V11 +Z{1Q(B� +s;) 
The solution is given by 
-. , Vs + V11 B i = Vs + QZ s , , 1 - Q (Zs + Z 11 ) 
-. ' v 5 +v11 B 2 = V 11 + QZ 11 , , 1 - Q (Zs + Z 11 ) 
(4) 
(5) 
The solution is always strictly positive because Q (Z � + Z { 1 ) < 1 as can readily be shown using the
definition of z/. So, at the Distinguished Nash equilibrium, the four bidders with the highest four
valuations in market k bid ii;. By definition, at least one of the two bidders with lowest valuations
in market k bids fl..�= s;/(l + e)3. Since these two bidders are actually identical (see Table 1), by
symmetry we shall consider that both extramarginal agents bid fl..� at the distinguished Nash
equilibrium. 
These Distinguished Nash equilibrium bids s; are given in Table 2. The table also gives the
demand and supply equilibrium values that would exist in the absence of the rebate or zero-out 
feature. As can be seen from (5), the Distinguished Nash equilibrium of the zero-out auction gives 
rise to prices above those which would result if a regular auction were used . That is, the equilibria 
under the zero-out feature are always larger than (Vs, V 11) which would be the competitive
equilibrium in the absence of the rebate feature. 
SECTION IV. EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
The experimental results are given in Figures 3 through 8. Shown there are the time series of 
bids tendered by all individuals in all markets. The dotted horizontal lines are the equilibrium pr ices 
corresponding to the Distinguished Nash equilibrium E in markets 1 and 2 for each experiment 
taken from Table 2. Leaving the details of the analysis of the data to the next section, we observe: 
Conclusion I. In the first set of experiments (1, 2, 3) we do not see any convergence to a Nash
equilibrium. In experiments 4, 5, and 6 bids eventually settle down near the Distinguished Nash 
equilibrium levels. 
Su pport: The figures clearly make the point. Prices in all markets of experiments two and three
exceed the Nash equilibrium by nearly a factor of two. Furthermore, the trend does not seem to be in 
the direction of equilibrium. The final prices in experiments 4, 5, and 6 all appear to be stabilizing 
around a value "close" to the Distinguished Nash equilibrium. Detailed statistical analysis will be 
presented later. 
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Table 2 :  Equilibrium Prices 
Competitive Equilibria Distinguished Nash 
Experiment Market Without Rebate Equilibrium 
Market 1 50 307 
1, 2, 3 
Market 2 25 196 
Market 1 50 128 
4, 5, 6 
Market 2 25 63 
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Efficiency levels for selected periods are presented at the top of Figures 3 through 6. As an 
ef fi measure we use the ratio of "the difference between the total valuation of the winners and 
lowest possible total valuation" to the "difference between highest and lowest possible total 
valuations." The average efficiency ratio is in the vicinity of 64 percent for the first set of 
experiments and over 85 percent for the second set. In general, Market 2 seems to be more efficient 
than Market 1 but the difference is insignificant and the separate numbers are not presented. As the 
process approaches the Distinguished Nash equilibrium as in experiments 4, 5, 6, the efficiency 
increases to near 100 percent. 
The data dramatically demonstrate support for one prediction of the Nash equilibrium 
model. 
Conclus ion 2. Inflation will occur over what would have been the prices without the rebate.
Support: Compare the Nash equilibrium range to the competitive equilibrium prices in Table 2. 
The data are near the Nash equilibria so the data demonstrate that the Nash model does have some 
merits. 
A glance at the data reveal that the process is characterized by dynamics that are beyond the 
scope of a static Nash equilibrium model. From the first three experiments an "explosive" possibility 
is evident. The purpose of the following section is to explore the nature of the dynamics of the 
decisions which generated these time series. 
The data from experiments 1, 2, 3 were available when parameter set 2 was derived. The 
motivation for the second parameter set involved distinguishing among hypotheses that were 
developed from the experimental data obtained from parameter set one. The discussion of data 
analysis below reflects this sequential decision process regarding the experimental design. 
SECTION V. ADJUSTMENT PROCESSES 
Oearly the data do not adjust immediately to the predictions of a static game model. Some 
sort of dynamic process is operating. Convergence to the Nash equilibrium is a complex 
phenomenon. Only a few theoretical papers have proposed some dynamic rational models, which 
are quite complicated even for the simplest of markets (Easley and Ledyard 1986, Friedman 1984, 
Wilson 1985, forthcoming (a) and forthcoming (b)). In this section, we propose and test against the 
data four simple dynamic processes to explain the behavior of bids over time. Model 1 is 
unconstrained by game-theoretic principles. Each of Models 2, 3, and 4 retain only some aspects of 
the one-shot Nash equilibrium and therefore are not fully rational. Though the proposed models are 
relatively simple, our position is that their validity relies on relative, satisfactory, explanatory, and 
predictive power of the observed dynamics. In addition, existence of simple decision rules, which 
over time give rise to the Nash equilibrium outcomes, would be important in explaining the previous 
experience of convergence to the Nash equilibrium in experimental markets and in weakening the 
rationality and informational requirements for the application of the Nash equilibrium concept. 
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For our purposes static game-theoretic principles fall into two categories: (i) conditions for 
equilibrium or system-wide consistency, and (ii) conditions for individual optimization. The former 
category serves as the basis for the traditional approach to modeling dynamic adjustment processes 
that we employ in subsection A. The latter has the foundations for the approach we propose in 
subsection B. In both cases, however, the dynamics are introduced through expectations. 
A. General Linear Adaptive Processes 
1. Models 1 and 2:
In these models we assume that each bidder i e J follows a bidding rule which is linear in 
his/her expectation of the revenue from the auction at time t .  As we shall see below, a justification 
for such a linear decision rule is consistent with the static Nash equilibrium model. With respect to 
. 
expectations, we assume that their formation is adaptive. Adaptive expectations first introduced by 
Cagan (1956) and Nerlove (1956), have been found in applied econometric studies to be quite 
successful and to outperform other types of expectations. Whether adaptive expectations or rational 
expectations will prove best is a topic of current research (see Williams 1987 and Daniels and Plott 
1987). Formally we assume: 
B 1. Linear decision rules: 
Bit =Ct.; +  �;R;; t = 1, 2, ... ; �; > 0. (6) 
Or, in terms that can be estimated 
B;, = a.; + �;R;; + u;, t = 1, .. . , T ; i = 1,2, . .. , 12. (6')
where u;, is an error term. 
Cl. Adaptive expectations formation: 
R;; = (1 - A; )R,_1 + A;Rti-1· 
The two properties together generate the first model. 
Model 1: The general linear adaptive model consists of Bl and Cl.
The model as stated simply postulates mechanical decision rules that do not depend on 
game-theoretic principles. The assumption B 1 says that bids are derived as a linear markup of the 
expected rebate. Assumption Cl says that each bidder revises his/her expectation at time t by a 
function of the discrepancy between the actual revenue and the expected revenue in the previous 
period. Cl gives a sequence of expected revenue for each i e I defined by 
1 -2
R;; = (1 - A; ) L AfR1 -l-s + A,/-1R;*1.
s=O 
(7) 
(8) 
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Cl  and B 1 together give a sequence of auction revenues over time which is described by the funct ion 
1-2 
R, = Lt ai + Lt [�i (l - /...,i) :LiA/R1-1-s] + Lt �i')..,/-1Rt1. (9) 
ieW, ieW, s=O ieW, 
where W1 is the set of winners at time t.
A reasonable additional restriction to add to Cl is 0 ::;  ')..,::; 1. This restriction is not added at 
the axiomatic level but it is discussed later with the estimation results. The following restriction is 
useful. 
C2. Common expectation adjustments: 
Ai = ').., for all i e J.
The second model to be developed now rests .in part on game-theoretic principals . Two 
behavioral principles that are taken from the properties of static Nash equilibrium behavior are added 
to the general linear adaptive model to fonn a second model. Let.!:'.'. k(i) denote the value of a slot of
the marginal agent in the submarket to which agent i belongs and let z �(i) be the rebate factor of the
marginal agent as defined in (3). The two new properties are:
B2. In each market the marginal bidders bid their value plus their expected rebate; i .e., ai = .!:'.'. k(i) 
and �i = Z �U) for the excluded bidders in each market for all t.
Assumption B2 requires that the marginal bidders, those that are excluded from the set of 
winners in the Nash equilibrium, bid the maximum possible subject to a no expected loss constraint. 
The excluded bidders bid as high as they can in their effort to become winners so a is at the level of
the value of a slot, Vi; and �i is a correctly calculated rebate factor.
B3. Infra-marginal bidders bid "just above" what they expect to be the marginal's bid, i .e., in (6) 
aj = (1 + 8).!:'.'. k(j) and �j = (1 + 8)Z �(j) for j e W
for all t, where 8 is "small. "
Assumption B3 together with Bl,  B2, Cl, C2, imply that the winners bid the minimum 
necessary to remain winners and place their bids only 8 above the bid of the losers. If the dynamic 
process described in Model 2 defined below converges to the Distinguished Nash equilibrium, then 8 
is equal to e defined earlier . 
Model 2. The strategic linear adaptive model consists of Cl and B l-B3.
The idea of Cournot expectations hypothesis has a long history in the development of 
economic theory . In the context of the linear adaptive models, the hypothesis has a very simple 
representation . 
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C3. Cournot expectation hypothesis. 
Ai = 0 for all i e J.
The hypothesis maintains that each decision maker assumes that the decisions of others will remain 
the same as the previous period. Obviously C3 implies C2. 
Adding C3 to the assumptions adds a substantial restriction to the strategic linear adaptive 
model. In this case we obtain a closed form expression for the sequence of bids under B 1-B3. In 
this case Ri; = R1_1 for all bidders and the following proposition can be derived.
Pro pos it ion 1. Under Cl-C3 andB1-B3 the sequence of bids for the marginal bidders (agents 5, 6, 
11, 12) satisfy 
1-1 !l. k(t) = .!:'.:: k + z �{R (O)[Q (1+8)�; +z;)11-1+[Cf1 + fz)/�; +z;>LE [Q (1+8)�; + z;)y}
s=l 
(10) 
where R (0) = auction revenue in initial period.
From equation (10) we have
Mik(t)=!l.k(t)-!l.k(t-1) 
= [Q (1+8)�; + z;)11-1 {l �R (O)[Q (1+8)�; + z;) - 1] + Q (1+8)Z �CI 1 + fz)}. (11) 
Pro posit ion 2. !l.k (t) converges to an assymptote if and only i f
0 � I Q (1  + 8)� � + z;) I < 1
Taking logarithms of both sides and adding an error term we get a form that can be 
estimated: 
log Mi k (t) = ex.+ Pt* + u (t ) , u1 - iid N (O,cr
2)
where 
t*=t-1 
(12) 
(13) 
The condition for the convergence of fl. k (t) given by (12) and referenced in Proposition 2 translates
into the condition that p, the coefficient oft* in (13), is negative. This forms the basis of tests to be
performed below. 
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2. Data Analysis: Experiments 1, 2, and 3.
The data for experiments 1, 2, and 3 are analyzed separately. This treatment pennits a 
deeper analysis of the models, the estimation techniques and the motivation for parameter set 2, 
which was used in experiments 4, 5, and 6. 
As seen in Figures 3 through 5 we do not observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium in 
the fi three experiments contrary to previous experience in experimental auctions. In experiment 1 
the bids, although increasing, remain well below the Nash equilibrium levels in both markets during 
the entire session. In experiments 2 and 3 we observe a faster increase in bids and bids remains 
above the Nash equilibrium level at the end of both experiments. These properties of the data can be 
expressed more fonnally by estimations of exponential functions but space demands that the visual 
impression must suffice and we move immediately to tests of the models. 
• Equation ( 13) is a natural first test. It involves the most restrictive set of hypotheses. So the 
analysis starts with it and then explores relaxations of the assumptions. 
Conclus ion 3. If the Cournot expectations hypothesis C3 is maintained with the strategic linear
adaptive model (Model 2), then the bids do not converge. The variable (5 is too large.
Su pport: This conclusion results from equation ( 13) estimated separately for each submarket using
the logarithm of the changes in minimum accepted bid as the dependent variables.4 The regression
results are given in Table 3 .  In all cases the coefficient oft* is significantly greater than zero which,
maintaining assumptions Cl-C3 and Bl-B3 and using Proposition 2 implies o is, on the average, too
big for convergence of bids. According to this model equilibrium does not exist in the sense of an 
asymptote of the dynamic process. 
Whether or not Conclusion 3 is accepted as an explanation of the first three experiments 
rests upon the hypotheses on which equation ( 13) is based. That is, if one or more of those 
hypotheses (Cl-C3, Bl-B3) turns out to be violated in the analysis of individual bids, the results 
based on ( 13) and reported in Conclusion 3 would not be directly applicable. We now explore the 
specifi of the most general model in order to detennine which "parts" of ( 13) are not reliable. 
The general linear adaptive model consists of only B 1 and Cl , which in (6') was written as: 
(14) 
We assume that for every i, u;, - iid N (0, cr?).5 The parameters to be estimated are
where µ; =Yi 1 - u; 1• See Appendix A for the estimation procedure.
Maximum likelihood estimates are presented in Table 4a and 4b. The R 2s are very high. For
fi of the seventy-two individuals the R 2s are over .90 and for fifty-two of the seventy-two the
R 2s are over .95. As a further check on the accuracy of the model we perfonn two specification
tests on the general validity of ( 14) and of the statistical assumptions on the error tenns. 
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Table 3 :  OLS Estimates 
" � Rz Exp. No. Market a t� 
1 1 1 . 1751 .0229 .0932 1 .538 
(.2220) (.0149) 
1 2 .2142 .0338 .2 105 2.366 
(.2203) (.0143) 
2 1 1 .5671 .0903 .5942 5.545 
(.3232) (.0163) 
2 2 .7239 . 1264 .5934 5.266 
(.3434) (.0240) 
3 1 1 .5585 .0731 .4720 4.632 
(.2437) (.0158)
3 2 .7999 . 1 026 .7721 9.018 
(.1758) (.0 1 1 3) 
log (B, - B,_1) = a+ �(t - 1) + u,
B 1 = minimum accepted bid at time t 
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Table 4a: General-Linear Adaptive Model-Experiments l, 2, 3 
(Standard deviations are below the coefficient estimates) 
Exp.No. Subject 
1*** 1 
1 2 
1 3 
1 4 
1 5 
1 6 
1 7 
1 8 
1 9 
1 10 
1 11 
1 12 
2 1 
2 2 
2 3 
2 4 
2*** 5 
2 6 
* H = Hausman statistic
** G =Godfrey statistic 
A 
� a 
-5.4190 .1783 
.5527 .0010 
-12.5300 .2032 
3.0773 .0079 
-11.7263 .1980 
.8369 .0014 
-12.5531 .1994 
.8768 .0014 
-5.6230 .1863 
.8129 .0013 
--6.2064 .1887 
.8932 .0015 
-5.0291 .0975 
1.4013 .0029 
1.9327 .0839 
.7485 .0013 
-5.7821 .0970 
.9342 .0020 
-9.1632 .1083 
7.5172 .0195 
-4.3978 .0972 
.9361 .0019 
--6.2537 .1051 
55.7683 .1474 
3.5287 .1610 
2.7627 .0023 
5.1388 .1590 
2.0355 .0017 
10.5069 .1526 
2.1064 .0009 
15.8830 .1441 
.9561 .0041 
16.1861 .1363 
3.4217 .0018 
67.8549 .0899 
2.5067 .0015 
*** Maximum likelihood does not converge. 
1.. 
-.9962 
.0069 
.5703 
.0858 
.4882 
.0144 
.4727 
.0128 
.3164 
.0075 
.4688 
.0180 
.5664 
.0425 
-.0038 
.0002 
.5977 
.0567 
.7500 
.1475 
.6172 
.0523 
.7266 
1.3781 
-.2188 
.1117 
-.4063 
.1171 
-.6953 
.0259 
-.8868 
.9118 
-.9962 
.0874 
-.7382 
.2134 
A 
R2 G** µ H* 
74.8520 .9983 .0161 1.6835 
82.1299 .9965 .1166 .0678 
32.1495 .9975 .0002 6.2401 
9.9339 .9960 .0585 .6264 
11.0098 .9968 .0046 1.8686 
5.9680 .9974 .0359 2.9987 
44.3921 .9982 .1909 4.7370 
1344.1782 .9909 .0011 4.9076 
14.7919 .9971 .0283 .0812 
36.0427 .9969 .0604 .0526 
16.9288 .9901 .0061 .0095 
37.3638 .9900 .0017 .2304 
143.5540 .9955 .0063 1.4063 
121.9938 .9952 .0010 1.3536 
82.1366 .9943 .0280 .0149 
77.2287 .9946 .0167 14.0848 
79.0411 .9912 .0389 7.1974 
111.3581 .4926 .2561 5.6743 
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Table 4a: General.Linear Adaptive Model-Experiments l, 2, 3 (continued') 
(Standard deviations are below the coefficient estimates) 
Exp. No. Subject 
A 
a. 
2 7 -14.0196 
.3904 
2 8 -10.0564 
1.2473 
2*** 9 -9.8516 
.2939 
2 10 -14.4853 
.9884 
2*** 11 24.6861 
4.9773 
2*** 12 4014.2335 
31051.7027 
3 1 13.2812 
1.7821 
3 2 6.6348 
.4575 
3 3 19.0295 
1.1578 
3 4 10.9858 
2.0206 
3 5 16.8180 
1.8375 
3 6 12.4340 
2.2525 
3*** 7 -892.6652 
2362.6910 
3 8 -7.7792 
.5145 
3 9 -.8126 
.3692 
3 10 -9.3693 
.5198 
3 11 -4.5426 
.4412 
3*** 12 -846.3691 
2831.1548 
* H = Hausman statistic
** G = Godfrey statistic 
� 
.1121 
.0004 
.1083 
.0005 
.1073 
.0004 
.1130 
.0005 
.0498 
.0020 
-3.5545 
27.9806 
.1558 
.0007 
.1648 
.0002 
.1510 
.0006 
.1518 
.0008 
.1423 
.0009 
.1502 
.0008 
3.3467 
8.6388 
.1239 
.0022 
.0994 
.0002 
.1152 
.0009 
.0995 
.0002 
3.3889 
11.1072 
*** Maximum likelihood does not converge. 
1., A µ 
-.8555 34.0191 
.0813 
-.9532 35.5939 
.0222 
-.9962 39.3101 
.0899 
-.7539 40.4785 
.0238 
-.9962 42.3778 
.0572 
.9962 20.7822 
.0300 
-.7734 120.2568 
.0293 
-.7070 118.8238 
.0139 
.1407 -185.6034 
.0109 
-.8594 105.7370 
.0155 
-.6719 131.3930 
.0739 
-.7539 114.5557 
.0447 
.9962 34.3558 
.0101 
.6680 13.7623 
.0212 
-.0038 -713.6254 
.0004 
.4766 40.2377 
.0242 
-.0038 4863.9260 
.0001 
.9962 29.7508 
.0129 
R2 H* G** 
.9985 .0052 2.8709 
.9955 .0514 5.0868 
.9931 .0791 .0021 
.9945 .0000 1.2926 
.2829 .0001 9.9462 
.4736 -.0158 4.5497 
.9715 .0017 .6698 
.9849 .0010 8.7551 
.9753 .0553 1.1767 
.9848 .0156 13.2137 
.9895 .0005 .6396 
.9903 .0144 12.1468 
.9962 -.2657 1.4643 
.9962 .1756 7.3876 
.9952 .0005 4.2764 
.9964 .0801 .1289 
.9943 .0315 2.3026 
.9968 -.0893 3.0076 
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Table 4b: General.Linear Adaptive Model-Experiments 4, 5, 6 
(Standard deviations are below the coefficient estimates) 
Exp. No. Subject 
4 1 
4 2 
4 3 
4*** 4 
4 5 
4 6 
4 7 
4 8 
4 9 
4 10 
4 11 
4 12 
5 1 
5 2 
5 3 
5 4 
5 5 
5 6 
* H = Hausman statistic
** G =Godfrey statistic 
... 
� ex 
-25.0547 .1945 
3.7849 .0044 
-43.0220 .2182 
.8129 .0010 
-32.5642 .2051 
2.5932 .0031 
-13.5749 .1700 
.4151 .0006 
123.8565 -.0501 
16.4980 .0203 
-1.6804 .1526 
1.6689 .0019 
60.3290 .0162 
1.8302 .0023 
34.8851 .0433 
1.3134 .0015 
36.4285 .0436 
1.5934 .0019 
49.7471 .0273 
1.0692 .0013 
29.0271 .0436 
1.6768 .0020 
24.2160 .0448 
.9185 .0011 
-18.7409 .1775 
.8668 .0009 
-30.1579 .1981 
1.5779 .0016 
-32.1223 .1959 
1.0548 .0011 
-3.8840 .1554 
1.9468 .0019 
43.0128 .0983 
1.0723 .0011 
18.7222 .0616 
.7752 .0008 
*** Maximum likelihood does not converge. 
� 
-.6132 
.3405 
-.7031 
.0282 
-.3555 
.0877 
-.9962 
.0160 
.5586 
.1181 
-.3868 
.1035 
.4336 
.0905 
.3711 
.0631 
.5547 
.0248 
.3828 
.0294 
-.0038 
.0007 
-.1641 
.0056 
-.7461 
.0154 
-.7968 
.0203 
-.7695 
.0167 
-.8828 
.0084 
.6680 
.0100 
-.7500 
.0156 
... 
Rzµ H* G** 
57.4111 .9864 .0473 15.5491 
53.5975 .9826 .0177 14.8688 
81.0979 .9894 .0012 7.0440 
60.4507 .9670 .0092 .8505 
8.8309 .0744 .0023 7.9155 
55.1355 .9685 .0001 6.5461 
19.9793 .9044 .0400 10.9132 
23.2278 .9628 .2001 22.3309 
26.0304 .9617 .0000 13.8155
81.9672 .9383 .0000 18.7834
1141.8633 .9761 .0089 2.1779 
137.8976 .9402 .0001 2.8410 
66.7613 .9676 .2513 19.7823 
64.6306 .9375 .8246 29.5259 
64.2337 .9626 .3865 26.3154 
72.2147 .9433 .0574 18.1912 
56.0277 .4312 .0114 .4469 
48.6479 .0685 .0229 26.4481 
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Table 4b: General Linear Adaptive Model-Experiments 4, 5, 6 (continued) 
(Standard deviations are below the coefficient estimates) 
Exp. No. Subject 
5 7 
5 8 
5 9 
5 10 
5 1 1  
5 12 
6 1 
6 2 
6 3 
6 4 
6*** 5 
6 6 
6 7 
6 8 
6 9 
6 10 
6*** 1 1
6 12 
* H = Hausman statistic
** G = Godfrey statistic 
.... � a 
40.4263 .0489 
1 . 101 1 .001 1  
35. 1978 .0530 
1 .0842 .001 1
45.3153 .0475 
1.3449 .001 3  
38. 14 1 1 .05 12  
1 .01 1 6  .0010 
43. 1346 .0428 
1 . 1831  .0012 
20.5706 .0507 
1 .8322 .001 8  
16.2107 . 1437 
1 .61 12  .0016 
9.0558 . 155 1 
.8802 .0009 
2 1 .541 8  . 1 364 
.6982 .0007 
30.0167 . 1273 
.6784 .0007 
64.2706 .0550 
35.6215 .0351 
3 1 .7151 . 1 142 
.5789 .0006 
-21 .8439 . 1 144 
.6952 .0007 
-3.7634 .093 1 
2. 1614 .0022 
-7.3156 .0950 
1 .5705 .0016 
5.643 1 .0745 
2.3383 .0023 
15.8739 .045 1 
9.7840 .0094 
149. 1241  -. 1064 
1 1 . 108 1 .01 1 8  
*** Maximum likelihood does not converge. 
� .... µ 
.7773 49.5 196 
.0063 
.8086 68.6148 
.0059 
.7930 48.9192 
.0070 
.7891 57.8280 
.0069 
.7657 44.9572 
.0086 
-.0038 -23 16.3515 
.0004 
. 1914 70.8910 
.0125 
.2 1 88 122.2901 
.0123 
-.0038 1569.8505 
.0002 
-.0038 2408.2264 
.0002 
-.9962 8 1 .9712 
. 1003 
-.3 125 1 19. 1288 
.0146 
-.6680 36. 1015
.01 1 8  
-.761 8  5 1 . 1217 
.0210 
-.3086 69.2866 
.05 10 
-.781 3  50.0648 
.0160 
-.9962 34.8026 
.0780 
.7891 -10.5374 
.0292 
R2 H* G** 
.9905 .0052 3.7414 
.9774 .0225 8.0284 
.9905 .0009 7.3530 
.9962 .0399 1 .9999 
.9802 .0336 .0000 
.9691 .0025 6.4342 
.9647 .0033 1 1 . 8734 
.9667 .0000 12.4561 
.9425 .001 1 10.2693 
.9679 .0003 10. 1055 
.2254 .001 7  .6903 
.9244 .0046 15.8567 
.7550 .0168 8.7875 
.6695 .0353 12.7436 
.8762 .0234 17.3237 
.55 1 8  .0035 .8652 
.3208 . 1076 17.2880 
.2765 .1070 .5779 
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Conclusion 4. Specification tests when applied to experiments 1, 2, and 3 fail to reject ( 14) and thus
lend support for the general linear adaptive model (Model 1). 
Support: A Hausman (1978) test and a Godfrey (1978) test were used as specification tests. These
results are as follows : 
a. Hausman Tests:
For each individual we test whether or not the individual 's bid deviates from the model 
prediction CJ.j + �i Ri; by an error which is uncorrelated with the individual 's expectation of R1 • To
perform a Hausman test , we obtain Instrumental Variables estimates of the parameters in addition to 
the ML estimates. A Hausman test statistic for test ing the null hypothesis that the expectation Ri; is
uncorrelated with ui, is 
(�IV - �MLE )2 D 2 (A ) (A ) � X(l) under H 0. var 1-1/V - var 1-1MLE 
(See Appendix A for details .) 
b. Godfrey Test:
For each buyer we test the hypothesis that the best l inear predictor of the buyer 's bid is 
ai + �iRi; by testing whether the errors Uu are white noise. We use Godfrey 's statistic since both 
Durbin-Watson (1950) and Durbin ' s (1970) h -statistics are inappropriate in that Ri; , by construction,
contains lagged endogenous variables. We test the null hypothesis that the errors are white noise 
against the alternatives 
HtR : UiJ - AR  (1) 
and 
Hf.A : Uit - MA (1) 
The test stat istic is T x R? where R? is the R2 obtained from the regression of ai on the RHS of ( 15)
and ail where ai l = (0, ai2• . . . , z217 ). (See Appendix A for details).
Both Hausman and Godfrey statistics are distributed x2 with 1 degree of freedom under the 
corresponding null hypothesis . Critical values are 2.706, 3.8 41, and 6.635 for 10, 5, and 1 percent
significance levels , respectively. The last two columns in Table 4a contain the values for these 
statistics. In all cases we fail to reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman test.6 For the Godfrey test
only in seven out of thirty-six cases we reject the null hypothesis at the 1 percent significance level.
At the 10 percent significance level, about half the cases survive the Godfrey test. Thus, these two
specification tests give support for the general linear adaptive model as claimed in Conclusion 4. 
The Cournot expectations assumption which was part of (10) , the model that led to
Conclusion 3, can now be examined more carefully .
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Conclusion 5. The Cournot assumption can be rejected in the presence of the general linear adaptive
model. 
Support: In Table Sa, for all except two of thirty-six cases, the A. estimates are significantly different
from zero.7
Observation. A significant proportion of A.s are negative in experiments 2 and 3. Since negative A.s
lead to an interpretation problem, these statistics might form a basis for rejecting the general linear 
model (at least the standard interpretation of Cl) in those two experiments. Experiment 1 does not 
have this problem. 
The picture that emerges so far is clouded. The Cournot expectations model can be rejected, 
but the jury is out on the rest of the model. The general model has mixed support. On the one hand 
the specification tests support the general linear model but on the other hand the observation above 
poses an interpretation problem for the model. 
We now turn to a different approach to testing that exists by virtue of the experimental 
methods used to produce the data. Because the experimental parameters are known, a direct test of 
the strategic linear adaptive model is possible. No need exists to rely upon specification tests alone. 
When coefficients of the model are tested against known parameters of the experiment as is indicated 
by B2 and B3, a different picture emerges The next conclusion suggests that the lack of existence of 
an asymptote of the dynamic process, which Conclusion 3 offers as an explanation of the first three 
experiments, cannot be accepted as an explanation. 
Conclusion 6. Model 2, the strategic linear adaptive model [( 14), B2, B3] can be rejected.
Support: Test statistics for testing B2 and B3 are given in Table Sa. The statistics t (a) is for testing
the null hypothesis that a.i = marginal bidder's value. t (�) is the t -statistic for the null hypothesis
that �i = marginal bidder's rebate factor � �) .  F statistic is for the null hypothesis that a.i = Y i  and 
�i = � ; . In only eight out of thirty-six cases we fail to reject this joint null hypothesis. However,
the fact that in five of these eight the maximum likelihood procedure does not converge reduces the 
number of cases where the joint null hypothesis cannot be rejected to three of the thirty-six cases. 
Thus the hypothesis tests lead to a rejection of the strategic linear adaptive model as applied 
to the first three experiments. The specification test results together with the very high R 2s suggest
that B 1 alone is not entirely off the mark, but the rest of the adjustment process in the previous 
section is not supported by the data. 
3. Data Analysis: Experiments 4, S, and 6.
Part of the motivation for parameter set 2 used in experiments 4, S, and 6 was the coefficient
estimates obtained from (13) despite the fact that (13) turned out to be misspecified at closer 
inspection. Recall from Conclusion 3 that under the hypothesis of (13) the variable o is so large that
the adjustment process does not converge. The new parameters were chosen so that an asymptote 
exists for larger values of o. Also, the Distinguished Nash equilibrium level is brought lower with
3 1  
Table Sa: Test Statistics, Experiments l ,  2, 3 
Exp. No. Buyer t (a) t (�) F 
1 1 -100.2754 50.8428 10374.7096 
1 2 -20.3 197 9.95 12 978.0645 
1 3 -73.7523 54.0459 968.6604 
1 4 -71.3392 5 1 .55 14 602.9177 
1 5 -68.4243 46.6207 1040.698 1 
1 6 -62.9264 42.0708 802. 1850 
1 7 -21 .4292 4.9677 8591 .5872 
1 8 -30.8 1 87 .7262* 2465.6702 
1 9 -32.9490 6.9555 926.3306 
1 10 -4.5447 1 .2949* 2614.6547 
1 1 1  -31 .4043 7.5274 229.9863 
1 12 -.5604* . 1497* 597. 1841  
2 1 -17.0421 15.5652 9.865 1  
2 2 -22.0391 20.4831 2.1224* 
2 3 -18.7487 29.4693 15.4402 
2 4 -35.6842 4.6281 10.2882 
2 5 -9.8821 6.4088 5.6125* 
2 6 7.1228 -23.4390 . 1 709* 
2 7 -99.9535 71 .6421 277.3643 
2 8 -28. 1058 49.8354 65. 1687 
2 9 -1 18.3948 65.7540 1 10.4960 
2 10  -39.9502 66.2944 61.3589 
2 1 1  -.063 1*  -16.9363 2.2042* 
2 12 . 1285* -. 1300* .0274* 
3 1 -20.6041 44.9414 5.7791 
3 2 -94.7928 1 85.0872 45.3135 
3 3 -26.7493 40. 1981 2.6523 
3 4 -19.3087 35.0025 1 1 .0152 
3 5 -18.0584 19.3946 .7927* 
3 6 -16.6774 30. 1989 6.5742 
3 7 -.3884* .3778* .0860* 
3 8 -63.7093 19.0043 63. 1033 
3 9 -69.9173 77. 1287 63.3463 
3 10 -66. 1234 36.3225 63.4482 
3 1 1  -66.9559 69.0779 43.2158 
3 12 -.3078* .2976* . 1224* 
* We cannot reject the corresponding null hypothesis at 1 percent level of significance.
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Table Sb: Test Statistics, Experiments 4, 5, 6 
Exp. No. Buyer t (a) t (�) F 
4 1 -19.8302 22.5847 101 .0389 
4 2 -1 14.4300 120. 1 893 277.91 10 
4 3 -31.8384 35.9962 148.5727 
4 4 -153. 1644 120.6668 434.6596 
4 5 4.4767 -7. 1621  9.6055 
4 6 -30.9676 29.6616 17.9902 
4 7 19.3038 -14.0446 80. 1962 
4 8 7.5263 -3.0604 58.9619 
4 9 7.1722 -2.3303 93.0922 
4 10  23. 1449 -15.8084 1 1 3 .8447 
4 1 1  2.4017 -2. 1940 1 . 1339* 
4 12 -.8535* -2.8092 19.2196 
5 1 -79.3074 92.5 125 95.3822
5 2 -50.7989 65.9981 72.4255 
5 3 -77. 8568 94.6752 105.2097 
5 4 -27.6783 3 1 .6808 14.8 108 
5 5 -6.5 163 3 .0467 . 1095* 
5 6 -40.3496 -42.0020 16.2343 
5 7 14.0097 .803 1 * 1 153.9850 
5 8 9.4057 4.4122 502.4972 
5 9 15.1050 -.4166 958.2708 
5 10 12.9903 3.0896 2691 .9955 
5 1 1 15.328 1 -4.4209 324.0271 
5 12 -2.4175 1 .4857* 6.5870 
6 1 -20.971 8  29.9024 65.5923 
6 2 -46.5175 65.5258 108.9895 
6 3 -40.7580 55.3 101 35. 1510
6 4 -29.4582 44.2471 59.2107 
6 5 .4006* -1 . 1408* 6.4283 
6 6 -31 .5853 29.9847 5.3 108 
6 7 -67.3839 88.6633 26.2216 
6 8 -13.3079 20.8022 13.8950 
6 9 -20.5770 29.5082 4 1 . 1271 
6 10  -8.2781  1 1 .3932 2.5077* 
6 1 1  -.3328* -.3106* 5. 1790
6 12 1 1 . 1742 -13.0648 9.9007 
* We cannot reject the corresponding null hypothesis at 1 percent level of significance.
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the new parameters and subjects are recruited for longer time so that, given a rate of change of bids 
close to the one observed in the first set of experiments, the bids pass through the equilibrium levels 
earlier in the experimental session. This would leave more time to observe the possible 
continuations of the phenomena observed in the last several periods in experiments 2 and 3, e.g., 
increase in the variance of bids after the Distinguished Nash equilibrium levels are passed through,
and the appearance of zero bids in the last several periods. 
The graphs of actual bids for the experiments 4, S, and 6 are in Figures 6 through 8. In all 
three experiments we observe convergence near the Distinguished Nash equilibrium in both markets. 
In spite of this observed convergence a surprising result is obtained from the econometric analysis. 
Conc�usion 7. The strategic linear adaptive model can be rejected.
Support: Table 4b contains the estimation and test results on model (14) for the new set of
experiments. Tests on the coefficients from Table Sb reveal that only in three out of thirty-six cases 
do we fail to reject the null hypothesis that slope and intercept coefficients both have the values 
suggested by B2 and B3. Thus, the strategic linear adaptive model can be rejected. 
Misspecification of model (13) is obvious from the fact that for more than half of the 
observations we have negative changes in the minimum accepted bids whereas the strategic linear 
adaptive model predicts a monotonic sequence of bids under Coumot expectations. So we do not 
estimate (13) with the new set of experiments. The econometric model reveals even deeper 
problems with this class of models. The next result shows that even the most basic form of the 
model can be rejected. 
Conclusion 8. The general linear adaptive model can be rejected.
Support: The model does not survive the specification test. For about two-thirds of the cases the 
Godfrey statistics are too high at 1 percent significance level. At 10 percent significance level we fail
to reject the null hypothesis for only seven out of thirty-six cases. (See Table Sb.) 
Next, we discuss some features of the general linear adaptive model to investigate possible 
sources of error in the light of previous estimation and test results. 
(i) The assumptions on expectation formation, C l ,  might have some justification in an asymptotic 
sense. Adaptive expectations can be justifiable from a rationality point of view in some 
particular kinds of stationary and nonstationary environments (Muth 1960). However, when 
applied to variables which exhibit trends or follow nonmonotonic paths, adaptive expectations 
imply persistent forecast errors. Asymptotically, as the underlying process becomes stationary 
these forecast errors go to zero, but in a finite sample which contains mainly disequilibrium 
observations persistent under- and over-prediction is a serious problem. In the same way, 
assumption C2 has an asymptotic justification at best. That is, in assuming that everybody has 
the same A. we are essentially arguing that if the expectations of each bidder are to be fulfilled
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in the limit then in the limit everybody must have the same adjustment parameter A.. Another
problem with this expectation formation model is that the agent's decision affects the variable 
on which he/she forms his/her expectation. However, since incorporation of this last remark in 
a model of adjustment process would require a full game-theoretic analysis of the underlying 
repeated game, we do not pursue this here. 
(ii) Despite the possible shortcomings of the expectation formation assumptions discussed above, 
we feel that the real problem is with the behavioral assumptions of the previous section. The 
strategic linear adaptive model (Model 2) when combined with assumption C2, has a special 
relation to the static Nash equilibrium: the conjunction of the assumptions imply that aspects 
of the static Nash equilibrium (zero profit for the marginals, inframarginals bidding "just 
above" the marginal 's bid, linearity of the marginal bid in revenue) hold in every period during 
the adjustment process. However, inspection of the estimates for Ai in Table Sa reveal that
under the maintained hypotheses B 1 and C l ,  and the statistical assumptions of UiJ (which by
Conclusion 4 are justified for at least the first set of experiments), none of the thirty-six cases
in experiments l ,  2, and 3 satisfy C2, B2, and B3 at the same time. 
Generally, the behavioral assumptions lack aesthetic and theoretical appeal from a process 
modeling point of view as will be discussed next 
(iii) The only merit of B 1 from a theoretical point of view is that it subsumes as a special case 
the behavior suggested by B2 and B3. We would like to have a decision rule which 
constitutes a solution to the decision-making problem facing the agent B 1 lacks this
property. 
(iv) B 1 through B3 use aspects of the one-shot Nash equilibrium and they are what we call
system-consistency conditions. Notice that the identification of marginal and inframarginal 
bidders is accomplished by an application of equilibrium conditions. The zero-profit 
bidding strategy for the marginal bidders, inframarginals bidding "just above" the marginals ' 
bid and linearity of the marginals ' bid, are all features of the one-shot Nash equilibrium
which we should not expect to be true out of equilibrium. For instance, out of equilibrium 
the marginal bidders need not bid so as to make their profits zero; rather they would have 
expectations about the minimum accepted bid in the next period in addition to their 
expectations about the revenue in the next period, and tender a bid which would give them 
positive expected profits as long as their expectation of the minimum accepted bid in the 
next period is less than the bid which would make their profits zero. That is, we can expect 
B2 and B3 to hold only asymptotically, not in every period. 
In the next section we drop the traditional approach based on system-wide consistency 
conditions and develop models which we believe do not suffer from the problems discussed above. 
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B. An Alternative Adjustment Process: 
The models we present in this section are based on decision-theoretic principles and do not 
impose the equilibrium properties of a game as conditions to be satisfied every period. We assume 
that the decision problem facing each bidder in every period is one of expected profit maximization 
under uncertainty. We leave for future research the possibility of modeling the situation as a 
repeated game with incomplete infonnation. Here, we seek to investigate the one-shot NE concept 
as the stationary point of a process. We have developed models that require less "rationality" on the 
part of the players since the steady state interpretation of the Nash equilibrium does not involve the 
"hyper rationality" of immediate equilibrium behavior that is imposed on the model by a correct 
game theoretic analysis. 
DI.  At each period t ,  every bidder i ,  i = 1 ,  2, . . .  , 12, is assumed to consider only three statistics 
of the behavior of other bidders in deciding how much to bid: 
Zu = the rebate factor for bidder i at time t ,  
Yu = second lowest bid among five rival bids in bidder i 's market, and 
Ru  = revenue from the three highest bidders among bidder i 's five rivals in the market in which 
i belongs, plus revenue from the other market 
E 1 .  Bidder i believes that (Zi, , R ii ,  Yu ) is a random vector distributed according to a law the joint 
density of which is g u (Zu , R u  , Yu ). 
We assume that i 's beliefs about others' beliefs, about others ' beliefs about i 's belief . . .  , 
etc. , do not play a role in his decision-making, or they are all summarized in git (· , · , ·) together with 
everything i knows about the structure of the game he/she is in. We do not go into details of how 
beliefs about the underlying unknown variables, i.e. , the valuations of the other bidders, are 
transfonned into beliefs about the three statistics Zu , R it , and Yu . For our purposes, gu might have 
been fanned taking into account the other bidders strategies in a fully "rational" way or might be a 
joint distribution without such game-theoretic content. For the specific cases considered below, 
however, we use the latter interpretation since the fonner would result in a host of additional 
questions which cannot be dealt with without a full-blown game-theoretic model. 
D2. Each buyer i is a myopic expected profit maximizer. 
Bidder i 's profit at time t is: 
nu = [Vi + Zu R ii + (Zu - l)Bu ] l{r. <B;, } (15) 
where l {r. <B� } = 1 if Yu <Bi, , 0 otherwise. Thus, in each period bidder i chooses his bid, B so 
as to maximize 
( 16) 
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Let E. O denote the conditional expectation of a random variable given that Y it < Bit and, 
let Fit O be the marginal distribution of Yit . Then (16) becomes 
E nit = [Vi + E. (Zu · R u )  + (E. (Zu ) - l)B u JFit (Bit ). 
Under D l ,  D2, and E l ,  i 's bid satisfies the first order condition for all t :  
(17) 
Fi;(B;t )[Vi + E. (Zu · R it ) + (E. (Zu ) - l)Bit ] + Fit (Bu )[E. (Zu ) - 1 + E: (Zu ) + E: (Zit · R it ) =  0 
(18) 
where F;; and E: O are the derivatives with respect to Bi, of F iJ and E: ('), respectively. 
Without some further structure on git (· , · , ·) , (18) is without any important content because any 
observed behavjor can be explained as a solution to an expected utility maximization problem for 
some belief structure. In particular, to compute E. (Zu · R iJ ) , E. (Zit ), E. (R it ) and Fit (Bit ) we need 
to specify the joint density git (· , · , ·), possibly up to some unknown parameters. Moreover, we need to 
specify how the beliefs git (·••) are upgraded given the past history. 
The following special cases are possible and simple candidates. The first case, E2, is natural but 
as will be discussed, it is  not tractable given the current state of theory. The second case, E3, 
involves further restrictions which might be undesirable but it yields an operational model. 
E2. Assume that (R it , Yit ) is jointly normal and Zit is independent of (R it ,  Yit ) with mean 2;1 : 
In this case 
and the first order conditions ( 18) becomes 
(19) 
where �(·) and <I>(') are the density and cdf of standard normal, respectively. 
To specify how the beliefs, git (· , · ,·) are updated over time, it now suffices to specify how 
(Zi1 , Ri, , Yu , Ofi. ,  cry. , Pit ) are determined, given the past. In one attempt to estimate ( 19) we 
assumed that Y;, is the minimum mean square error forecast of Yi, based on observations on Y;, up to 
time t - 1 in a model which speci.fied Yit as a linear function of its lagged value. The standard error 
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of forecast from this prediction rule is taken to be or, . In this attempt, the same was done to 
generate proxies for Ru and Oif, · Pit was taken to be the sample correlation between Rit and Yit up 
to time t and Zt = Z/ for all t .  However, with the beliefs upgraded in this way, serious numerical 
problems appear because, based on the estimated ay, , the function <I>(·) is essentially zero for most of 
the sample. Beliefs generated on the basis of forecast models which involve two-period lagged 
values of the relevant variables also did not solve this problem. In addition, forecasts generated by 
these models exhibit persistent over- and under-prediction. Thus we dropped E2 from further 
consideration. 
Next we consider axioms placing further restrictions on the resulting model and which involve 
fewer unobserved variables. The axioms dictate the form of git (· ; ;) and the nature of updating over 
time. Two cases are considered. In one case the updating is based on lagged values and in the other 
case expectations are more forward looking. 
E3. Assume 
(i) Zu , R it and Yit are independently distributed with means i;, , Rit , and Yu ; 
- -
(ii) Yu is uniform on [Yu - du , Yu + du ]  ; 
(iii) R;t = Ri , t-1 ; 
(iv) Y;t = Y; , i-1 ; 
- X; 
(v) Zit = ---­Lje W,_,Xj 
(vi) d;1 = p/d;o . 
E4. Assume 
(i) Zu , R it , and Yu are independent with means Zu , Rit , and Y;, ; 
- -
(ii) Yit is uniform on [Yu - du , Yu + du ] ; 
(iii) Rit = Ru ; 
(iv) Yu = Yu ; 
- Xi 
(v) Zu = --­'L1e w,X1 
(vi) d;t = p/fi;o . 
Observe that E3(i)(ii) and E4(i)(ii) are the same assumptions. Under either assumption E3 or 
E4 the maximization problem ( 16) can be solved. The optimum bid, the solution to ( 18) when the 
corner solutions are considered, is given by: 
B ;, = 
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- -
= (Y·1 - Ll · )( l - Z·1 ) - V. 
"fR · < I II I I t ,, _ Z; 
V; Z;, = 1 - 1 
+ R;, + -2 Yu - -2 Llit otherwise 2c1 - zit ) 2c1 - zit )  
(20) 
As a matter of fact (20) gives the unique solution to the maximization of ( 16) unless the first 
condition in (20) holds, in which case there are many solutions which all give zero expected profit 
and are characterized by the condition B it  ::;; Y it - Llu . Thus, the particular solution (20) has the 
property of being the largest of these optimal bids. 
From E3 and E4 together with previous assumptions we obtain two new and different models. 
Model 3. The lagged expectation decision theoretic model consists of assumptions 01, 02, El ,  
and E3. 
Model 4. The unbiased expectations decision-theoretic model consists of assumptions 0 1, 02, El ,  
and E4. 
The term "unbiased" is used because on average, there will be no difference between the mean 
of the beliefs about the value of a variable and the actual mean of the random variable. The 
expectations are not based on perfect foresight because beliefs still have a variance. Expectations are 
not fully rational because all data are not used to generate the estimate. Furthermore, the beliefs 
cannot be rationalized because the individual behavior based on those beliefs does not generate 
system data consistent with those beliefs. In fact, as will be seen below, the beliefs as postulated in 
Model 4 can have significant aspects of irrationality. 
Both Models 3 and 4 are closely related to the static Nash equilibrium as is demonstrated by the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 3. If Pi = p for every i and if 0 < p <l ,  then the bid functions implied by Model 3 and 
Model 4 asymptotically approach a Nash equilibrium bid function. 
Proof. Ll approaches zero as t approaches infinity and (20) becomes a Nash equilibrium bid 
function. Then notice that the marginal agents' behavior is asymptotically given by the first 
condition of (20) and the inframarginal agents are asymptotically given by the second condition. 
For every individual, the parameters in Models 3 and 4 are (Pi ,  LliO, Vi ). Although possible in 
principle, estimation of these parameters is complicated and time-consuming. Moreover, suggested 
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procedures for similar but less complex models with switching regimes give estimates, but the 
sampling properties of which are, in general, unknown (Judge et al. 1980). To reduce the 
dimensionality of the problem, we take advantage of the fact that V; are known coefficients. To 
estimate the remaining parameters, we apply nonlinear least squares technique to (20) (see, e.g., 
White and Domowitz 1984). Specifically, we minimize the sum of squared errors using a two­
dimensional grid search for p; and .Llrn to obtain estimates pm . .5.;0 of the remaining coefficients. 
To evaluate Models 3 and 4 we look at the forecast accuracy of these models. The estimates for 
p; and .<'.l;o for each individual using the first T - 8 observations in the sample are given in Tables 6 
and 7 for Models 3 and 4 respectively. The R 2s for the estimation periods are reported in Table 8. 
Using the estimated coefficients, we generate forecasts for the last eight observations and compare 
them to the observed bids. Lastly, instead of performing a detailed specification testing of Models 3 
and 4 as we did for the general linear adaptive model, we compare the forecast performance of these 
models to the models presented in the previous section, Table 9, Table 10 and Table 11. 
Conclusion 9. Among the four, Model 2 is decidedly worse than the other three models. Model 1 
and Model 3 cannot be distinguished in view of the statistical evidence. Model 4 is the best from 
among the four models. 
Support: Tables 9 and 10 contain statistics for comparing forecast performance of four models 
when applied to the time series of bids for each of the 72 individuals in the six experiments. Each 
model is estimated using the initial T - 8 bids for each individual and then forecasts for the last eight 
bids are obtained based on the estimated parameter values. The forecast accuracy measures we use 
are root-mean-squared error (RMSE) and Theil's U coefficient. For both measures, lower values are 
associated with better forecasts: 
[ 
T ] 112 
RMSE = t=t-? (11 -x1 )2 /8 
[J_,<*• - x, f /s] 
112 
u = -----------
where x, is the actual value of the variable to be predicted and £1 the predicted value. 
The statistics are presented in Tables 9 and 10. Table 1 1  contains a summary of the 
comparison. 8 Model 1 has the lowest RMSE in twenty out of seventy-two cases, Model 2 in fifteen 
cases, Model 3 in eleven cases, and Model 4 in twenty-seven cases when all four models are 
considered for choice. Theil's U gives the same ordering when the four models are considered 
simultaneously. Although Model 4 is the best model in all subsets of the four models, ranking of 
Model 3 improves considerably when the four models are ranked based on pairwise RMSE 
Table 6: Parameter Estimates for Model 3 
(Based on T - 8 observations) 
" 
Exp. No. Subject p 
1 1 .75 
1 2 .51 
1 3 .99 
1 4 .97 
1 5 .85 
1 6 .96 
1 7 .69 
. 1 8 1 .01 
1 9 .99 
1 10  .73 
1 1 1  .97 
1 12 1 .02 
2 1 .99 
2 2 .98 
2 3 .93 
2 4 .96 
2 5 1 .08 
2 6 .96 
2 7 1 .01 
2 8 1 .01 
2 9 1 .07 
2 10 1 . 13 
2 1 1  .82 
2 12 .97 
3 1 .98 
3 2 .99 
3 3 1 .06 
3 4 1 .03 
3 5 .87 
3 6 .88 
3 7 1 .01 
3 8 1 . 15 
3 9 .96 
3 10 .96 
3 1 1  .92 
3 12 .92 
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" 
do 
36 
144 
66 
82 
19 
6 
24 
121 
65 
1 8  
37 
1 8  
128 
138 
69 
58 
4 
23 
127 
124 
6 
3 
250 
1 8  
127 
1 10 
6 
8 
63 
58 
123 
2 
45 
5 1  
37 
35 
" " 
Exp. No. Subject p do 
4 1 1 .00 13  
4 2 1 .02 10 
4 3 1 .02 10 
4 4 .94 13  
4 5 1 .02 51 
4 6 .94 20 
4 7 .95 23 
4 8 1 .01 74 
4 9 1 .00 55 
4 10 .96 19 
4 1 1  1 .02 4 
4 12 1 .01 9 
5 1 1 .00 139 
5 2 1 .01 100 
5 3 1 .00 100 
5 4 .98 60 
5 5 .99 38 
5 6 1 . 15 5 
5 7 .98 9 
5 8 .87 27 
5 9 .97 10 
5 10 .93 16 
5 1 1  .52 6 
5 12 1 .05 6 
6 1 .99 15 
6 2 1 .00 15 
6 3 .98 13 
6 4 .95 3 1  
6 5 1 .03 3 1  
6 6 1 .06 4 
6 7 .95 1 18 
6 8 1 .08 5 
6 9 .99 69 
6 10 1 .04 1 1  
6 1 1  1 .03 16 
6 12 1 .02 31  
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates for Model 4 
(Based on T - 8 obseivations) 
Exp. No. Subject 
A Lio p 
1 1 .64 63 
1 2 .55 250 
1 3 .52 68 
1 4 .98 85 
1 5 .52 170 
1 6 .51 3 
1 7 .68 41 
1 8 .52 66 
1 9 .99 70 
1 10 .51 1 16 
1 1 1  .98 40 
1 12 . 83 16 
2 1 .95 5 
2 2 1 .()<) 1 
2 3 .96 87 
2 4 .52 161  
2 5 .93 8 1  
2 6 1 .04 21 
2 7 .51  95 
2 8 .56 123 
2 9 1 .01  44 
2 10 1 . 12 1 
2 1 1  . 87 250 
2 12 .57 71  
3 1 1 .01 1 14 
3 2 .65 78 
3 3 1 .01 1 
3 4 .5 1 35 
3 5 .62 212 
3 6 1 .08 1 
3 7 .93 6 
3 8 .51  60 
3 9 .74 33 
3 10 .67 38 
3 1 1  .51  1 
3 12 .97 1 
A A 
Exp. No. Subject p � 
4 1 1 .02 8 
4 2 1 .06 4 
4 3 .98 161  
4 4 .59 44 
4 5 1 .01  63 
4 6 .91 48 
4 7 .97 17 
4 8 1 .00 88 
4 9 1 .05 3 
4 10 .97 18  
4 1 1  .51  125 
4 12 .96 24 
5 1 1 .00 145 
5 2 1 .00 123 
5 3 .99 125 
5 4 .96 86 
5 5 .98 50 
5 6 1 . 13 6 
5 7 .51 64 
5 8 .92 17 
5 9 1 .01  4 
5 10 .92 16  
5 1 1  1 .04 1 
5 12 1 .01  16 
6 1 1 .02 7 
6 2 1 .02 9 
6 3 1 .02 5 
6 4 1 .06 2 
6 5 1 .02 39 
6 6 1 .07 2 
6 7 .99 93 
6 8 .99 91 
6 9 .98 89 
6 10 1.00 31 
6 1 1  1 .02 20 
6 12 1 .02 30 
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Table 8 :  Estimation Period R 2 
Exp. No. Subject Model 1 Mode1 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1 1 .9939 .6 134 .9662 .9877 
1 2 .9740 .5 168 .9040 .8356 
1 3 .9926 .5197 .9826 .99 13 
1 4 .9936 .4648 .9808 .9503 
1 5 .9876 .5963 .9709 .9517 
1 6 .9922 .4970 .98 19 .9591 
1 7 .9932 . 1690 .8729 .9426 
1 8 .9614 .7651 .8785 .7773 
1 9 .9848 .7268 .9697 .9484 
1 10  .9918 .8 186 .8897 .9042 
1 1 1  .9523 .7900 .9399 .9150 
1 12 .9524 .8363 .7930 .7938 
2 1 .9938 .0493 .9872 .9894 
2 2 .9782 .0750 .9663 .9756 
2 3 .9964 .0184 .9789 .9892 
2 4 .9924 .0145 .9594 .9865 
2 5 .9938 .0421 .9766 .9869 
2 6 .9849 .0010 .9235 .9156 
2 7 .9933 . 1 106 .9684 .9699 
2 8 .9755 -.0136 .8957 .9735 
2 9 .8974 -.0098 .8070 .8614 
2 10 .9629 .0459 .9148 .9609 
2 1 1  .8656 .0120 .8854 .8709 
2 12  .881 8  .0378 .8992 .9743 
3 1 .9958 -.0350 .9950 .9919 
3 2 .9981 -.0748 .9952 .9862 
3 3 .9976 -.0330 .9902 .9975 
3 4 .9986 -.0171 .9892 .9975 
3 5 .9985 -.0262 .9769 .9905 
3 6 .9940 -.0252 .9665 .9939 
3 7 .9881  .0432 .9808 .9872 
3 8 .9883 .0701 .9872 .9783 
3 9 .9923 -.0447 .9480 .8747 
3 10 .9875 .0236 .9599 .9697 
3 1 1  .9986 .0992 .9863 .9956 
3 12 .9947 .0891 .9749 .9947 
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Table 8 (Coritinued) 
Exp. No. Subject Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
4 1 .9784 -.0708 .9608 .9353 
4 2 .9755 -.0478 .9560 .9424 
4 3 .9843 -.0521 .9712 .9524 
4 4 .9725 -.0207 .98 14 .9621 
4 5 .0324 .0104 -. 1715 -. 1544 
4 6 .9760 -.0095 .9766 .9793 
4 7 .7 127 -3.2091 .5076 .3579 
4 8 .9408 -3.5 103 . 8687 .8378 
4 9 .9546 -2.3849 .8548 .83 17 . 
4 10 .8253 -5.7954 -1.5861 -1 .8586 
4 1 1  .9248 -. 1287 .9122 .5455 
4 12 .8999 .0565 .8636 .7462 
5 1 .9609 -.2432 .745 1 .7034 
5 2 .9368 -.5596 .6808 .6898 
5 3 .9590 -.3289 .6724 .6961 
5 4 .9 188 -.0352 .3015 .2703 
5 5 .2964 .0004 . 1749 . 1660 
5 6 .0871 .0112 .4091 .3419 
5 7 .98 15 -5.6413 .9613  .85 19 
5 8 .9548 -6.3565 . 8 14 1  .8820 
5 9 .9844 -6.6958 .9583 .9575 
5 10  .9934 -7.5376 .9262 .8096 
5 1 1  .9591 -4.0174 .9088 .9246 
5 12 .9361 -.0250 . 8394 .7461 
6 1 .9584 -.7548 .9474 .8966 
6 2 .9614 -.8790 .9209 .8490 
6 3 .9 176 -.4275 .9337 .9008 
6 4 .9543 -.8 167 .9714 .9377 
6 5 . 1214 -.0005 -.0820 -.0378 
6 6 . 8940 -.0046 .9180 .9259 
6 7 .7 1 8 1  -.2524 .7839 .5927 
6 8 .6173 -.2238 .7591 .4857 
6 9 .8506 -.3609 .7830 .5873 
6 1 0  .5829 -.0988 .4327 .3124 
6 1 1  .2604 .0142 .0870 .3923 
6 12 .2 132 .0002 -.5414 -.3396 
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Table 9: Root Mean Squared Error 
Exp. No. Subject Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1 1 5.0044 12.7610 8.6946 1.9673 
1 2 2.8807 12.6738 8.7105 2. 1503 
1 3 10.1648 1 1 .9177 9.3358 2.3452 
1 4 7.9601 12.8136 6.2096 5.4050 
1 5 7.5896 13. 1 149 7.0743 1.58 1 1  
1 6 6.3 157 13.4094 4.7668 1.8028 
1 7 1 .4616 23. 1965 3.8301 1.4522 
1 8 4.5522 22.9423 2.2667 1 .4577 
1 9 1 .3308 24.8199 2.0921 3.4555 
1 10  10. 1908 23.8264 3.2601 1 . 1726 
1 1 1  1 .9656 23. 1 15 1  3.0 1 1 8  2.9773 
1 12 1 3.3200 22.334 1 2.8726 2.0866 
2 1 43.8600 53.8555 15.9549 34.6988 
2 2 46.4090 54.4100 17.4352 27.8765 
2 3 68.7419 48.2436 47.75 14 24.7200 
2 4 70.5841 34.3853 35.6305 14.4307 
2 5 207.9288 16.4528 22.3368 18.7806 
2 6 10.25 1 1  1 67.4522 1 67.0524 1 64.4814 
2 7 86.5671 47.0971 75.2085 177.7881 
2 8 1 14.3237 43.0453 77.5901 176.693 1 
2 9 12.1542 42.5655 124.5541 147.9618  
2 10  32. 1716 47.7582 120.0194 172.2621 
2 1 1  296.4577 148.0377 158. 1495 169.8515 
2 12 261 .5 190 2 15.4075 221 .5227 252.5885 
3 1 77.6482 79.4317  45.6869 42.7483 
3 2 77.4096 91 .2905 39.4562 63.2944 
3 3 73.7920 5 1 .2777 45.2817 51 .4630 
3 4 80.7749 61 .7365 48.9196 36.79 16 
3 5 76.6143 33.9323 26.3032 27.0275 
3 6 69.6497 52.7505 48.2757 22.9148 
3 7 25.3851 33.3 1 8 1  24.6253 20.5813 
3 8 23.8 1 18 27. 1221 23.4605 1 1 .9687 
3 9 33.2069 19.2309 15.0360 10. 1 1 13 
3 10 25.2690 32.9230 26.923 1 16.544 1 
3 1 1  20.2741 19. 1870 24.4982 16.7929 
3 12 20.3638 36.9389 33.5408 25.4352 
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Table 9 ( Co.ntinued) 
Exp. No. Subject Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
4 1 1 .5 148 8.6874 8.7106 9.3753 
4 2 2.9547 10.8033 9.7832 15. 1 822 
4 3 1 .7737 8.3463 10.3916 1 1 .2762 
4 4 9.9634 10.4070 10.9883 10.9886 
4 5 69.3824 91 .4544 67.4737 67.7670 
4 6 8.7056 10.7873 10.3054 13.3665 
4 7 5.2204 6.9427 2. 1898 1.6835 
4 8 5.3590 3.4524 4.9418  1 .5837 
4 9 6.4366 6.0883 2.2810 9.9436 
4 10  6.8 175 3.7276 2.0841 2.9034 
4 1 1  1 . 1362 .6286 2.0729 3.3541 
4 12 4.0743 6. 1775 2.7923 4.5150 
5 1 7.1973 4.7970 12.8779 12.5973 
5 2 15. 1496 6.7379 9.6075 20.2853 
5 3 9.7026 7.0888 14.4640 23. 1782 
5 4 4.4915 5.2953 6.2651 2.2504 
5 5 5.9228 1.9856 12.2709 10.7712 
5 6 100.7203 140.8 128 .0000 .0000 
5 7 1 .2810 20.4035 1 .6265 4.4581  
5 8 3.7056 19. 1396 4.0858 2.9594 
5 9 2.4874 21 .8270 2.9917 1 .3246 
5 10  1 .4674 19.65 1 8  2.7232 3. 1274 
5 1 1  1 .5 1 1 1  16.0300 3.2016 2.6583 
5 12 .7855 1.4618  6.5088 1.9405 
6 1 8.9980 2.8347 5.5694 1 1 .68 16 
6 2 9.0486 3.5806 8.8600 14.4587 
6 3 3.8866 2.3237 3.9362 6.8210 
6 4 4.9596 3.3339 3.5361 3.2135 
6 5 13.3544 18.9020 37.7629 3 1.7459 
6 6 7.7271 8.6638 13.8256 10.4179 
6 7 3.7875 7.8301 9.3748 10. 8550 
6 8 5.9905 12. 1778 20.2985 7.9448 
6 9 3.8408 8.62 1 1  2.7324 8.3689 
6 10  28.5964 23.5592 24.2169 23.7142 
6 1 1  12.9072 14.0228 18 .7723 16.4953 
6 12 3.4188 1 .4892 32.9025 32.9052 
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Table 10: Theil' s  U Coefficient 
Exp. No. Subject Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1 1 .0193 .0466 .033 1 .0073 
1 2 .01 10 .0463 .0332 .0080 
1 3 .0397 .0433 .0354 .0087 
1 4 .0309 .0468 .023 1 .0200 
1 5 .0298 .0480 .0270 .0059 
1 6 .0248 .0491 .01 8 1  .0067 
1 7 .01 13 . 1530 .0300 .01 1 1  
1 8 .0341 . 1501 .0172 .01 12 
1 9 .0107 . 1655 .0161 .0263 
1 10 .0743 . 1576 .0256 .0090 
1 1 1  .0154 . 1525 .0224 .0221 
1 12 .0930 . 1461 .0220 .0159 
2 1 .0544 .0749 .0200 .0444 
2 2 .0572 .0756 .0217 .0354 
2 3 .0838 .0673 .0633 .0318  
2 4 .0899 .0488 .0483 .0190 
2 5 .2690 .0239 .0314 .0252 
2 6 .0200 .2382 .2420 .2337 
2 7 . 1 1 10 .0995 . 1483 .3759 
2 8 . 1 862 .0920 . 1538 .3770 
2 9 .0240 .0916 .2619 .3235 
2 10 .0585 .1007 .25 1 6  .3601 
2 1 1  .4798 .3395 .3606 .3678 
2 12 .6906 .6490 .68 1 1  .7022 
3 1 .0859 .0983 .0505 .0472 
3 2 .0828 . 1 108 .0430 .0715 
3 3 .0854 .0660 .0551 .0609 
3 4 .0909 .0777 .0586 .0430 
3 5 .0892 .0442 .0324 .0322 
3 6 .0796 .0670 .0587 .0270 
3 7 .0490 .0678 .044 1  .0383 
3 8 .0445 .0550 .0417 .0225 
3 9 .06 14 .0390 .0291 .0190 
3 10 .0456 .0657 .0509 .0307 
3 1 1  .0388 .0389 .0483 .03 17 
3 12 .0389 .075 1 .0644 .047 1 
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Table 10  (Continued) 
Exp. No. Subject Model 1 Mode1 2 Model 3 Mode1 4 
4 1 .0056 .0323 .03 1 6  .0338 
4 2 .0106 .0399 .0345 .0520 
4 3 .0064 .03 1 1  .0370 .0395 
4 4 .0388 .0405 .0427 .0432 
4 5 .3794 .4 1 16 .3886 .3843 
4 6 .0346 .0423 .041 1 .0534 
4 7 .0350 .0503 .0154 .01 1 8  
4 8 .0375 .0257 .0373 .01 14 
4 9 .043 1 .0444 .0158 .0656 
4 10  .0470 .0277 .0149 .0207 
4 1 1  .0090 .0048 .0162 .0252 
4 12  .0330 .0490 .0232 .0368 
5 1 .0242 .0167 .0424 .0417  
5 2 .0488 .0233 .03 1 6  .0644 
5 3 .0319  .0245 .0467 .0730 
5 4 .0155 .01 85 .0219  .0077 
5 5 .0213  .0070 .0452 .0395 
5 6 1 .0000 1 .0000 .0000 .0000 
5 7 .0070 . 1253 .0089 .0250 
5 8 .0202 . 1 1 85 .023 1 .0167 
5 9 .0135 . 1328 .01 63 .0071 
5 1 0  .008 1 . 12 14 .0152 .0176 
5 1 1  .0087 . 1015  .018 1  .0155 
5 12 .0057 .0104 .0489 .0141 
6 1 .0344 .01 12 .0216  .0443 
6 2 .0343 .0141 .0335 .0536 
6 3 .0150 .0091 .0154 .0261 
6 4 .0190 .013 1  .0139 .0126 
6 5 .0605 .0790 . 1997 . 1 627 
6 6 .0321 .0358 .06 12 .0454 
6 7 .0270 .0582 .0636 .0716 
6 8 .0409 .0869 . 15 1 8  .0507 
6 9 .027 1 .0630 .0188 .0558 
6 10  .2 175 . 1 840 .2086 . 1 868 
6 1 1  . 1201 . 1 173 . 1959 . 1665 
6 12 .0280 .01 1 8  .3528 .3528 
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Table l la: The Number of Agents for Which the Model Yields the Lowest Root Mean Square 
Error from Among the Comparison Models 
RMSE 
Comparison 
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1, 2, 3, 4 20 15 1 1  27 
l ,  2, 3 27 19 26 
l, 2, 4 22 17 33 
l ,  3, 4 26 18  29 
2, 3, 4 25 16  32 
l ,  2 45 27 
1 ,  3 34 38 
l, 4 34 38 
2, 3 3 1  4 1  
2, 4 29 43 
3, 4 32 39 
Table l lb: The Number of Agents for Which the Model Yields the Lowest Theil 's U from Among 
the Comparison Models 
THEIL' S U  
Comparison 
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1 , 2, 3, 4 20 16  9 28 
1, 2, 3 28 18 26 
1 ,  2, 4 23 1 6  33 
1 , 3, 4 28 15 30 
2, 3, 4 24 15 34 
1, 2 45 26 
l,  3 36 36 
1 , 4 36 36 
2, 3 30 42 
2, 4 28 44 
3, 4 29 4 1  
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comparisons; according to pairwise comparisons the four models are ranked as Model 4, Model 3, 
Model l ,  and Model 2 from best to worst in tenns of RMSE . Pairwise comparisons based on Theil 's 
U do not give a unique transitive ordering of the four models. However, Model 4 is at least as good 
as the competing models in all subsets of the four models in tenns ofTheil's U .  
An argument based on aesthetics can be made for a choice of Model 3 or 4 over Model I. On 
the surface the improvement of Model 3 or 4 over Model 1 seems not overwhelming and therefore 
any choice of Model 3 or 4 over Model 1 must involve some intuition beyond those embodied in the 
statistics. The intuition begins with the observation that the extremely high R 2 of Model 1 suggest 
that little leeway exists for any improvement at all on Model 1 .  Nevertheless, Models 3 and 4 do 
achieve some improvement in a forecasting sense and they do so by utilizing only two parameters to 
be estimated (p, .1.o) as opposed to the three parameters of Model 1 (ex., �. A.). Furthennore, we know 
from Conclusion 8 that Model 1 fails all specification tests for the second set of experiments. Even 
though the same tests cannot be perfonned on Models 3 and 4 they could do no worse than Model 1 .  
We refrain from calling Model 4 a rational expectations model because of the obvious 
irrationality implicit in the constituent assumptions except E4.iii, iv, and v. Even when one is 
willing to maintain all the assumptions and impose the restriction that 0 < p; < l ,  the beliefs may 
assign positive probability to impossible events; e.g., although negative bids are impossible in any 
period, �io may take values which, for some periods, imply a positive probability on the impossible 
event that Yu takes a negative value. Figure 9 contains an example where this occurs based on the 
estimated parameters. In experiment 5, subject 4 exhibits the behavior between periods 10  and 20. 
In the case of Model 3, another check for a violation of rationality may be done by looking at the 
- -
situations where the observed value of Yu falls outside the internal [Yit - �u ,Yu + �u ] = 
[Yi ,i -1 - pf�;o.Y; ,1-1 + p/�;0], which is an impossible event according to the model. This problem is 
observed to be persistent in the case of experiment 3, subjects 5, 6, 1 1 , and 12. The time series for 
subject 1 1  as shown in Figure 10 demonstrates the phenomenon beginning with period 17 and 
remaining periods. In other cases this is mainly a short-term phenomenon which is corrected in one 
or two periods. This second type of inconsistency is not a possibility under Model 4 and this may be 
considered a point in favor of Model 4 in a choice among the two models. 
Another advantage of Model 4 over Model 3 concerns the problem of observed values of the 
parameter p. Although we do not have estimates for the standard deviations of the estimated 
parameters for Models 3 and 4 to check whether the observed parameters are statistically greater 
than l ,  mostly the p estimates are either less than or close to 1 (grid search for this parameter is 
perfonned in the range [0,2.0]). In terms of the number of cases with p estimates exceeding unity, 
Model 4 is less problematic than Model 3. We have twenty-three cases with p 's over unity in Model 
4, whereas in Model 3 thirty-six estimates are above 1 .  This may be considered another point in 
favor of Model 4 against Model 3 in that p 's exceeding unity imply an individual assigning positive 
probability to an impossible event persistently. 
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Figure 9: Actual bids and predicted bids according to Model 3 and Model 4, and bounds for 
expectation of Yi (1 ) for subject 4 in experiment 5. 
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Figure 10: Bounds of expectations of Yi (t ) (second lowest bid among i's rivals) according to model 
3 and the realized value of Yi (t ) for subject 1 1  in experiment 3. 
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SECTION VI. ·CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Prior to gathering any experimental data when considering the zero-out auction as a solution to 
the Port's problem, two radically different classes of models existed in the deliberations. The first 
class involved models that are unconstrained by principles of game theory at either the system level 
or at the individual level of analysis. One model in this first class is the simple (myopic) demand 
and supply model in which the potential revenue returns are not reflected in the bidding decisions of 
participants. Another model in this class is what we termed the general linear adaptive model which 
postulates simple mechanical markup rules used by participants. The second class consists of 
models that are based on principles of game theory to varying degrees. 
The data demonstrate that game-theoretic principles are relevant After mfilly periods of 
stationary parameters, the zero-out auctions studied here converge near the Distinguished Nash 
equilibrium of the static game-theoretic model (Conclusion 1). This result is consistent with a long 
history of experimental work that demonstrates convergence to static Nash equilibria. Thus the data 
led us to reject both the simple demand and supply model (Conclusion 2) and what we call Model 1 , 
the general linear adaptive model, in favor of models in the second class with game-theoretic content 
(Conclusion 8 and Conclusion 9). Clearly the full set of the principles which led to the static Nash 
equilibrium as defined in Section III are not relevant because the equilibrium is not immediately 
attained. Some sort of convergence is observed. The problem thereby posed is to determine which 
principles should be retained and how they should be implemented for statistical purposes. 
Two different approaches were used to develop models that utilize game-theoretic principles. 
Both approaches yield models that converge to the Distinguished Nash equilibrium so both have a 
priori consistency with important stylized facts (Proposition 2 and Proposition 3). The first was the 
traditional approach in which the principles governing system behavior were imposed. This 
approach is captured in Model 21 the strategic linear adaptive model, in which the equilibrium 
conditions are imposed at every period. Properties of the system equilibrium conditions are used to 
define the decision rules of specific individuals. In the second approach the system equilibrium 
conditions are dropped but optimization conditions are imposed at the individual level of analysis. 
Both approaches permit aspects ofleaming, or updating from experience. 
Analysis of the data led to a rejection of the traditional approach (Conclusion 7) in favor of the 
decision-theoretic approach of Models 3 and 4 (Conclusion 9). Principles of individual optimization 
at every instant appear to be natural but the imposed system equilibrium conditions when modeling 
the dynamic adjustment process do not. The distinction between models 3 and 4 led to a further 
refinement of the principles of individual decisions. The implicit "irrationality" that occurs when 
equilibrium conditions are dropped appear in the expectations formation of individuals. Model 3 
assumes that expectations reflect only learning in the sense of updating from prior experience. 
Model 4 goes further and allows the individual to be forward looking to a degree reminiscent of the 
absence of surprises dictated by a full game-theoretic specification. Individual beliefs about other's 
actions are on average correct in Model 4. Model 4 seems to best fit the data and it is encouraging 
that this different approach to dynamics has resulted in models that are such good competitors within 
sample and one which is in fact marginally better in terms of out-of-sample predictions (Conclusion 
9) . 
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We think that the evolution of thinking that resulted in the series of models in Section V 
demonstrates the importance of structural modeling in forecasting, and the unique role of 
experimental data from an econometric point of view. Not only are the econometric tools useful in 
giving direction to the experimental method (Conclusion 3) but the experimental data provide a 
special opportunity to study econometric methods. To make this last point clearer, let us assume that 
the data we have were field data, and we were interested in testing the specification given in Section 
III.A, i.e., linear adaptive model, and that we only had such information about the mechanism by 
which the data were generated that might exist in the field case. It is clear that we would be 
restricted to a subset of the tests performed in Section V .A, namely, to tests on the specification of 
error terms (Conclusion 4)and on the signs of some parameters, since we would not have strong 
theon:tical restrictions on the values of some parameters. Under such conditions it is likely that we 
would have failed to reject the linear adaptive model; results for experiment 1 are a case in point. 
The fact that the data are obtained in an experimental setting with known values for some 
parameters--capacities and values-enables us to test the model by comparing the coefficients 
obtained when the model is imposed on the data to  the known parameter values. Observe that fo r  the 
first three experiments it is mainly these additional restrictions which cause rejection of the model 
which performed rather well in terms of standard tests on the error terms (Conclusion 6). This we 
think highlights a unique role for experiments in generating data on which the validity of an 
econometric model can be more thoroughly tested. 9 Notice also that these restrictions allow us to 
concentrate on other characteristics of an otherwise intractable model, e.g., equation (20) in Section 
V.B. 
We close with observations about the Port's problem which is considerably more complicated 
than the problems we have been able to address. Two issues seem to be of central relevance to those 
interested in the applied problem as seen by the Port. First,  inflation of bids should be expected. 
The amount of inflation could be on the order of the Nash equilibrium if one exists. Secondly, many 
features of the markets studied here cannot be relied upon in the field case of the Port and the 
consequences of these features on existence of equilibria and are unknown. In particular, the 
exogenous correlation between values and capacities is important for existence and it is also likely to 
be important for efficiency. The absence of an aftermarket is important to  existence. A restriction on 
the number of slots a carrier can buy is also important for existence of the static equilibrium. Of 
course the values of Vi and Xi are almost certainly to be endogenous rather than constants as carriers 
use price concessions to maintain high levels of capacity. In view of the complexity of the applied 
problem, the advances offered here are certainly modest. However, several of the empirical questions 
are well within the grasp of current experimental techniques and the development of an appropriate 
model should be along the lines of Model 3 and Model 4. 
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APPENDIX A 
NOTATION: 
Vi = redemption viilue of the i th player (i = 1 ,  . . .  , 12) 
Bit = bid of the i th player at time t 
Zi = rebate factor for player i 
Rt = total revenue at time t 
R1; = expectation of R for the i th player 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
A l .  Bid Equation 
(a) Bit = <Xi + �iR; + Uu t = 1 ,  . . .  , T ;  i = 1 ,  . . .  , 12 
(b) for any i u11 - iid N (O,al) 
A2. Expectation Formation 
(a) R;; = OiRt-l + (1  - oi )Ri� t-1 t = 2, . . .  , T ;  i = 1 ,  . . .  , 12 
(b) Rt°1 treated as an unknown constant. 
ESTIMATION: 
The unknown parameters are (ai .�; ,O; ,R;*1 ,a'f) i = l , . . .  , 12. 
A2.a. gives for the i th player: 
R; = O; [R1-1 + (1  - O; )R,_z + · · · + (1  - O; )1-2R i] + (1 - o; )'-1R/'1 , t ;;::: 2 . 
So the model for the i th player is 
Define µi = a; + �; Rt1 , A.; = (1 - O; ), CJ.j• = a; O; , �t = �; O; . So the new parameters are 
(at .�t ,A.; ,µi ,a'f). The model becomes: 
The joint log-likelihood of (B;2, . . .  , B1T)  is: 
T "' "' 2 L; = k - (T /2) log ar - (l!2a;2)(Bi l - µ; )  - (1/2a() L (Bit - µi A.f-1 - <X; lt (A; ) - �j R, (A; )) t=2 
where 
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k = constant. 
Maximization of L; wrt (a;* .�t ,µ; ,A.; ,cr;2) gives the maximum likelihood estimator which is strongly 
consistent and asymptotically efficient for (at'.�;"'.A.; ,cr;2) but not consistent for µ; (see e.g., Judge et 
al. ( 1985) p .  383) given the correct specification of the model. 
An asymptotically equivalent estimator is obtained by omitting the first observation . This latter 
estimator is easier to compute and is obtained by m aximizing the marginal log-likelihood for 
(B;2, . . .  , Bit ): 
T 
L; = k - (1/2)(T - 1) log cr? - (1/2 cr;2) L (Bit - µ; A./-1 - a;* l, ('A; ) - �t R, ('A; ))2 
(see Klein ( 1958) , Zellner and Geisel (1970)). 
Let 
B/ = (B;z, . . .  , B,T )' .  
The (marginal) ML estimator is given by: [ A ] µ; .... . "' ' "' ! "" ' a · = (X· X· )- X· B· I I I I I �t 
1=2 
and 'f..; minimizes SSR; (A; ). This value 'A; is obtained by a grid-search over (-1 ,  1) for A; .  
To obtain the approximate covariance matrix of the ML estimator (at', �t. 'A; ) ,  we define 
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I • /-1 x, (A.i ) = (A.i , l, (A.i ) ,R, (A.; )), (t th row of X(A.; )) 
w I (Aj )  = ( 1, (Aj ) ,R, (Ai )) 
so that W (A.i ) is obtained from X (A.i ) by deleting the first column. The likelihood for the t th 
observation (t � 2) is: 
{;1 = constant - (112) log at - (112ah [Bit - x/(A.; )0; ]2 
where { [ l ,0,0] for t = 2 
dx/(A.; ) = 
[(t - l )A.f-1, 1 + 2A.i + · · · + (t - 2)A./-3, R,_2 + 2A.;R,_3 + · · · + (t - 2)A.f-3R i] for t >  2. 
where dw/ (A.; ) is obtained from dx/ (A.; ) by deleting the first column. 
where 
[0,0,0] for t = 2 
2 I [t - 1 , l ,0] for t = 3  d x, (A.i ) = [(t - l)(t - 2)A.t-3, 2 + 6A.i + · · · + (t - 2)(t - 3)A.f-4, 2R1_3 + 6A.iRt-4 + · · · + (t - 2)(t - 3)/..f -4R i .  
for t >  3 .  
Define 
[ a{� , aiit ] 
(}y; . aA.; 
57 
where eit = B;, - x,'(A; )S; is the OLS residuals. Define 
Then 
Define 
&, = [ �:(�, )] 
W, = [ w,'(�; )J 
A 2 d' � 2 A 2 E; = zag [c;2 , . . . , e,7 ] . 
A A 4 W; .... 2 A A 
[ 
A I l D = (1/cr; ) -;:-;-;:- E; [W; I dX; 0; ]  0;dX; 
iJ2{; 
dy;dyi 
a2f; 
at..;d-ti 
a2{; 
d-(;at..; 
a2(; 
at..; at..; 
A I 0 dW; e; 
A A 2 W; A A "' 2 I 
I A I 
j 
A = -(1/cr; ) [-;;:-;--;] [W; I dX; 0; ] + (1/cr; ) - - - - l-- - -
0;dX; A I A I 0 e; dW; I 
where dW; is obtained from dX; by deleting the first column. 
Then the White (1981)  robust approximate covariance matrix of the ML estimator (at'.�t'.'5..; )  is [ "' ·1 a; • " - I A "-! Ap. Var. t = A  D A  . 
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If the model is correctly specified then one can use, instead, either 
[ A  
·
i Ct.; • " -1 Ap. Var. �: = D  . 
The ML estimator of the initial parameters (et.; ,j3i ) is obtained by 
&; = &t1c1 - 'Ai ) 
�j = �t1c 1 - 'Ai ) 
The approximate covariance matrix of ( ai .�i )  is given by 
Ap. Var. [:�] = ft ' Ap. Var. [ �] ft 
Ct.j [ A  ·1 where Ap. Var. �:· is given above and 
,. , [ 1/(1 - 'Ai )  
p = 0 
0 
1/(1 - 'f..; )  
SPECIFICATION TESTING: 
A . .{' 2] Ct.j /(1 - Aj) 
�;*/(1 - 'Aj )2 
For any individual i ,  we want to test that the individual's bid Bil deviates from the model prediction 
a.i + l3iR; by an error uil which is uncorrelated with the individual 's expectation Ri; as claimed by 
assumption Al .a: Bit = a.i + j3iR; + Uit . 
However, Ri; and ui, are both unobserved. In addition, the estimated expectation 
R.i; = �i [R,_1 + (1  - �i )R,_2 + · · · + (1 - �i y-2R t l + (1 - �i y-2 R.t1 is by construction of the ML 
estimates orthogonal to the estimated error ai, = Bil - µi 'A/-1 - a./'1 , (1..i ) - �iR, (Ai ). 
We shall use a Hausman (1978) test which requires an additional estimator of 0. This estimator is an 
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instrumental variables (IV) estimator (see, e.g. , Liviatan (1963) , Judge et al. (1985, pp. 390-391 ) . 
For t ;;::: 2, we have 
Bi 1-1 = a.i + �iRt°,1-l + Uj 1-1 . . ' 
Multiplying the second equation by Ai and subtracting it from the first gives, using A2.a, 
Bit = a./' + �/'R1-1 + 't..iBi ,1-1 + (u;, - 'A; u; ,1-1) for t  ;;:: 2, 
Bil is correlated with (uil - 'A; u; ,1-1) .  But note that R1_1 = L Bj ,i-l may also be correlated with 
jeWH 
(uil - 'A; u; ,1 -1) . Thus, we use three instrumental variates which are (l  ,R1_2,R1_3). Deleting the first 2 
observations, IV estimator of (a./'".�/'".'Ai ) is 
[ - "'] cr .  I - • I -1 I 0;  = : ;. = (R X; ) R B; 
where 
Bi = (Bi3• . . .  , B,T) 
1 R2 R 1 
1 R3  R2 
R =  
1 Rr-1 Rr-2 
Approximate covariance matrix of the IV estimator is 
where 
[ - "'] CJ.i • 2 ' -1 ' ... ' -1 Ap. Var. �:• = 1; (R X; ) R 'l';R (X; Z) 
2 � 2  - I -si = [ 1/( 1 + J1.i )] [B; - X; 0 ; ] [Bi - Xi 0 ; ]  
1 + X} I -X.i 
-X.i 1 + x. �  I 
'Pi = 0 -X.i 
0 0 
(see Liviatan ( 1963)). 
Then ·rv estimator of ai and �i are 
ai = at1( 1 - X.i )  
60 
0 0 
-X.i 0 
1 + X.l 0 
0 1 + X.;2 
The approximate covariance matrix of (ai .� i ) is  given by 
Ap. Var. [ ::] =P ( Ap. Var. i! P1 
where f> i is defined as Pi above with X.i replacing 'Ai . The Hausman ( 1978) test for testing the 
hypothesis that the expectation Ru is uncorrelated with the residual, uu , is 
where Ap. Var. �i is the approximate variance of the ML estimator �i of �i under correct 
specification. 
D 
Hi � Xa> under the null hypothesis of no correlation. 
For any individual i ,  we also want to test that the best (in the mean squared error sense) linear 
predictor of the individual i ' s  bid B ii is ai + �i R;; .  This is done by testing the ui1 are white noise as 
asserted by Al .b: uu - iid N (O,a?). However, the expectation Ri; may contain lagged endogenous 
variables since R1 = L Bj,1 ,  so that the usual Durbin-Watson (1950) statistic for testing against u;, 
jeW, 
being an AR(l) is inappropriate. Durbin (1970)'s h -statistic for testing against Uu being an AR(l) 
process cannot also be applied. 
We use Godfrey ( 1978) tests which can easily seem to be applicable even when the model is 
nonlinear. To test H 0 : u;, - iid N (0, ) against H! : Uu - AR (p )  or uil -MA (p ). Let 
a; = Bi - X  ('Ai )0i (the vector of estimated residuals) , 
a� = (0,0, . . .  , 0, U2, · · · ,  UT-k )1 
k zeros 
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and U;p = [un , -. . .  , u;p ] .  
The .ML estimator of the first p auto-correlation coefficients of u,� are given by 
/ A 2 A l A 2  2 (p 1 , . . . , pp ) = (1/Tcr; )U;pu; where cr; is the .ML estimate of cr; given above. 
The statistic for testing against HJ. is at = (T - l)RJ, where RJ, is the R 2 of the regression of u; on 
[X (�; ) ; U ;p ] . 
D 
at � X� ) under Ho· 
We test H 0 against H At. 
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APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. Various research 
foundations have provided funds for the conduct of this research. The instructions are simple, and if 
you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn a considerable amount of money 
which will be paid to you in cash after the experiment. Please check your folder for the contents 
listed on the chalkboard. The information in the folder is your own private information. You are not 
to reveal this information to anyone. 
In this experiment we are going to conduct two separate markets called Blue and Yellow. 
The market in which you will participate has already been determined. Those with blue forms and 
with blue printed by their identification number on the folder will participate in the Blue Market. 
Those with yellow forms will participate in the Yellow market. The currency to be used in the 
experiment is francs. Each franc is worth __ dollars to you. 
A fixed number of units will be sold in each market to the highest bidders. Each individual 
can purchase at most one unit. Your earnings are computed as follows. If you are awarded a unit 
from the auction you receive a redemption value for the acquired unit as shown in row 1 of your 
information sheet. In addition, if you acquire a unit in the auction you receive a proportion of the 
revenue from both auctions as a rebate. In addition to any earnings from the auction, you are paid a 
capital payment each period. The amount of the capital payment is listed in row 6 of your 
information sheet. 
If you acquire a unit 
earnings = redemption value + rebate - your bid + capital payment 
If you do not acquire a unit 
earnings = capital payment 
The blanks on the Record sheet will help you record your profits. Enter your bid on line 4 
when your bid is submitted. If you acquire a unit during the first period the redemption value should 
be recorded on row 1 at the time of purchase. You should then add the rebate and subtract what you 
paid for the unit (your bid) as directed on rows 3 and 4. At the end of the period record the total of 
profits and capital payment on the last row on the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded 
similarly. 
Computation of the rebate 
Rebates of winning bidders will be announced after each period. However, we show you 
how the number is calculated so those who did not win can determine what their rebate might have 
been. 
On the information sheet you will see a capacity number assigned to each bidder. These 
numbers are used in the following two formulas: 
Bidding 
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[ J . [ Total sales revenue l Your rebate = Your rebate factor in both markets [ Your capacity ] 
Your rebate = all . . b"dd wmnmg 1 ers 
in both markets 
[Sales revenue Sales revenue l 
. 
in Blue market + in Yellow market 
The market for this commodity will be organized as follows: we open the markets for each 
tradin·g period by announcing the total number of items for sale during that period. Each of you as a 
buyer purchase units by submitting a bid, on a bid form, which may be accepted or rejected. The bid 
form will include your buyer number, the period number, and your bid for the unit. 
Bids are accepted or rejected each period as follows: the bids will be collected from all 
buyers and ordered from the highest bid to the lowest bid. If n units are to be sold then the highest n 
bids will be accepted. For example, with 8 units offered for sale, the highest 8 bids will be accepted, 
and the lower bids will be rejected. In the case of ties at the lowest accepted bid, random numbers 
will be used to determine which of the bids will be accepted. In each market the highest bid, the 
lowest accepted bid and the highest rejected bid will then be announced. The winners and the 
amount of each rebate will be announced. Each buyer will then fill in his record of purchases and 
earnings for that period for the accepted bids. 
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TEST 
1 .  Suppose that 3 units are available in each market, and the bids are as given below. 
Individual A 
Bid 30 
Capacities 1 
B 
20 
3 
Blue 
c 
10 
6 
D 
5 
7 
E 
4 
9 
a. Detennime the winners in Blue and in Yellow. 
b. Detennime total revenue. 
c. Detennine the rebate factor for B:  
F 
20 
10 
G 
10 
8 
Yellow 
H 
5 
5 
2. Suppose your bid is 60, total revenue is 500, and your rebate factor is 10%. 
a. Calculate your rebate. 
b. If your value is 100, what is your profit? 
I 
3 
4 
J 
2 
2 
R E C O R D  
B uye r N o .  
Pe riod 1 2 3 4 5 6 
l Red emp t ion 
V al ue 
2 Reb a t e  
) Ne t I n come 
( row l+row 2 )  
4 B i d  
5 T o t a l  per 
per iod 
( row 3-row 4) 
6 Capi t al 
P ayme n t  
7 Ea rn ings 
NAME ���������������������-
SOCIAL S ECURITY N O . 
S H E E T 
7 8 9 10 1 1  
CAPAC I TY 
1 2  1 3  1 4  1 5  
°' 
V\ 
R E C O R D S H E E T 
B uyer No . ( con t inued) 
P e r i o d  1 6  1 7  1 8  1 9  20 2 1  2 2  2 3  
l Redemp t ion 
Val ue 
2 Reba t e  
3 N e t - In come 
( row !+row 2)  
4 B i d  
5 T o t a l  per 
per i od 
( row 3-row 4)  
6 Cap i t a l  
Paymen t  
7 Earnin gs 
NAME ----------------------
SOC IAL S ECURITY NO . 
--------------
2 4  2 5  2 6  2 7  2 8  
CAPAC I TY 
2 9  30 
°' 
°' 
I N F 0 R M A T I 0 N 
Your redemp tion value 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 
Redemption 
val ue 
Capacities of all people in the market 
Person 1 2 3 4 5 
Capacity 
6 7 
6 7 
S H E E T 
8 9 10 
8 9 10 
1 1  1 2  1 3  14 1 5  
0\ 
-..J 
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FOOTNOTES 
* We acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech 
Program for the Study of Enterprise and Public Policy. Comments by David Grether, John 
Ledyard, Michael Levine, Jennifer Reinganum, and Richard Sutch have been very helpful. 
1 .  What would be the implications fo r  carriers that use New York airports as hubs? Does the 
process impact differently between small and large carriers or between carriers that operate 
during several times of day as opposed to only one time of day? Would carriers that operate at 
several different New York airports be advantaged or disadvantaged? Would entry, airfares, 
etc. be affected? 
2. In what follows we use the same notation for a set and its cardinality. 
3 .  The other extra marginal bidder can bid anything as long as  it is  less than or  equal to fll. 
4. In estimating (13) we lose two observations in experiment 2 market 2 and experiment 3 market 
2 since the change in the minimum accepted bid is negative. 
5 .  We neglect the possible correlation between Uu and Ujt ,  i '# j .  This leads to inefficient but not 
inconsistent estimates provided Uu and R;; are uncorrelated. This latter condition is satisfied if 
u;1 is uncorrelated over time and Ru depends only_ on the past, as assumed. 
6. For two cases we get negative values for the Hausman statistic because of nonconvergence of 
the maximum likelihood procedure. 
7. The standard deviation estimates in the tests on coefficients are White ( 1982) robust estimates. 
8. Models 3 and 4 have the same RMSE in one case and the same Theil's U in two cases. Models 
1 and 2 have the same Theil's U in one case. These ties cause row totals in the comparison 
table to add up to more than seventy-two in some comparisons. 
9 .  For similar use of field experiments in evaluating econometric models, see R.  J .  LaLonde 
(1986). 
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